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This thesis investigates three different issues in applied macroeconomics.
In the first chapter (co-authored with Roberto Pancrazi) we document
that long-run expectations of both households and, especially, financial in-
termediaries about future housing prices had a large impact on households’
home equity extraction during the pre-crisis boom in U.S. housing prices.
Using a model of collateralized credit market populated by households and
banks we find that: (1) mild variations in long-run forecasts of housing prices
result in quantitatively considerable differences in the amount of home eq-
uity extracted during the boom; (2) the equilibrium levels of debt and interest
rate are particularly sensitive to financial intermediaries’ expectations.
In the second chapter (co-authored with Patrick Fève), we investigate the
macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a setting in which private agents
receive noisy signals about future shocks to government expenditures. We
show how to empirically identify the relative weight of news and noise shocks
to government spending and compute the level of noise for Canada, the UK
and the US. Embedding imperfect fiscal policy information in a medium-
scale DSGE model, we find that with a persistent change in expected public
spending, the existence of noise (as estimated using actual data) implies a
sizable difference in fiscal multipliers compared to the perfect fiscal foresight
case.
The third chapter studies the impact on the real economy of frictions
stemming from the financial sector. First a non-linear medium scale DSGE
with real and nominal rigidities is solved, where the non-linearity is induced
by an occasionally binding constraint on banks’ capital. Then likelihood-free
methods are used to estimate the model on Italian data from 1999 to 2014.
A key result is that the non-linear the model is able to generate business cy-
cle asymmetries observed in actual data that cannot replicated with linear
v
models. The model is then used for testing the usefulness of various macro-
prudential policies, finding that taxing banks’ leverage proves to be rather
effective in smoothing the volatility of real variables, although there is no
one-size-fits all policy, as each of them has a different impact on various fea-
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After the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 the founding paradigms of modern
macroeconomics have been significantly questioned both from within the
profession and in the public opinion. On the one hand, it has been force-
fully argued that the New-Keynesian DSGE orthodoxy was not adequately
equipped for explaining episodes of crisis such as the one that followed the
Lehman collapse or the one surrounding the sovereign debt crisis in the eu-
rozone in 2011-2012. Therefore, a more accurate investigation of the mechan-
ics of the financial sector and of the financial side of the economy has been
praised. On the other hand, the role of informational frictions came more
and more at the centre stage along with the study of limits in the ability
of processing information on behalf of economic agents and the impact of
partial information on business cycle dynamics. These essays span different
subjects, while sharing a willingness to go beyond the pre-crisis paradigm,
trying to embed both aspects. In the first two chapters the role of imperfect
information and of biases in processing information is highlighted in two dif-
ferent contexts. The last one is an attempt to highlight the role of the finan-
cial sector on the business cycle and the relevance of endogenously induced
asymmetries.
Natural Expectations and Home Equity Extraction In the first chapter (co-
authored with Roberto Pancrazi) we propose a novel explanation for the in-
crease in households’ leverage during a housing price boom in which a wide
availability of financial instruments allows agents to borrow today against
the future expected value of their houses. We show that long-run expectations
about future house prices of both households and, especially, financial inter-
mediaries have a large impact on households’ indebtedness. We are inter-
ested in assessing how the behavior of agents in the credit market is affected
by natural expectations - that is, the tendency to base forecasts on simplified
models that fail to take into account the long-run mean reversion of house
prices after a positive short-run momentum.
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The assumption that households behave in line with the natural expecta-
tions theory when confronting house prices is largely supported by empirical
work. One novelty of this paper is its insight in documenting that financial
experts also had natural expectations when they made their housing price
forecasts - in the sense that they, too, ignored any form of long-run mean re-
version in housing prices after the positive and strong short-run momentum.
Specifically, we gather a unique dataset of out-of-sample housing price fore-
casts made by a professional forecasting company in the period 1995-2011
and show that these forecasts do not display any sort of adjustment after a
period of short-run positive momentum: forecasts made prior to 2006 pre-
dict constant and large increases in long-run housing price until 2030. Then,
we show that housing prices are characterized by hump-shaped dynamics,
which imply a large momentum in the short run and partial mean rever-
sion in the long run. We find that models that incorporate hump-shaped
dynamics are not preferred, in terms of in-sample fit, to more parsimonious
models that ignore long-run mean reversion. As a result, the use of simple
models leading to natural beliefs is fully justifiable in terms of in-sample per-
formance. Finally, we demonstrate that models that have diverse degrees
of ability to capture hump-shaped dynamics in housing price market may
differ in their long-run forecasts, while leading to similar short-run predic-
tions. Hence, agents that make use of simple models fail to take into ac-
count the partial mean reversion of housing prices in the long run. Then,
using a tractable model of a collateralized credit market populated by house-
holds and banks and calibrated to the recent house price boom-bust episode,
we find that: (1) mild variations in long-run housing price forecasts result
in quantitatively considerable differences in the amount of home equity ex-
tracted during a boom; (2) home equity extraction data are better matched
by models in which agents are fairly natural; (3) the equilibrium level of debt
and its interest rate are particularly sensitive to financial intermediaries’ nat-
uralness.
Noisy Fiscal Policy In Chapter 2 (co-authored with Patrick Fève) we extend
the conventional framework of news shocks in fiscal policy considering an
environment with imperfect information on fiscal policy. Given the consid-
erable uncertainty surrounding the implementation of fiscal policy, it seems
natural to extend the setup to imperfect information about news to the case of
government spending. We thus focus on the macroeconomic effects of noisy
fiscal policy announcements. By noisy announcements, we mean the follow-
ing: A policymaker announces a fiscal policy measure at a particular point
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in time that is supposed to come into effect at a future date, while private
agents in the economy believe that the announcement may not be fully imple-
mented. Partial implementation may be due to amendments that occur dur-
ing the legislative process or to incomplete information about future states of
the economy. As a consequence, the information structure we examine is dif-
ferent from previous papers in which future fiscal policy is fully predictable.
Thus, the main contribution is twofold: i) we quantify the size of noisy news
using data from both forecasts and realizations of government spending; ii)
we assess the effect of noise and its propagation through the economy using a
medium-scale DSGE model with real frictions. The main result of this paper
is that a “noisy” announcement leads to an under-reaction of macroeconomic
variables to the announcement itself. The values of the fiscal multipliers dras-
tically fall compared to the full information case. We make use of the official
government spending forecasts from the annual budgets of three countries
(Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States) for which we were able
to obtain enough information. We find that the amount of noise observed
for these three countries is rather significant: the share of noise in these of-
ficial government spending forecasts ranges from 28% in the US to 84% in
the UK. When embedding these estimates into a full-fledged DSGE model,
we find that in a “noisy” scenario, before news events are realized, the value
of government spending multipliers, compared to the full information case,
falls proportionally to the level of noise. Additionally, the effect of noise does
not vanish with the occurrence of the fiscal shock. For example, in the UK,
for which the relevance of noise is most compelling, we obtain a loss in the
output multiplier of approximately 10% one year after the materialization of
the news compared to the perfect information case. Such an effect is more
pronounced for investment, even in economies in which the role of noise is
limited; for example, for the US, which is the country with the lowest share of
noise among those considered, we find that the loss in the investment multi-
plier one year after the realization of a news event remains at approximately
12%, a non-negligible figure.
Financial Frictions, Macroprudential Policies and the Real Economy In
Chapter 3, I attempt at quantitatively gauging the asymmetric impact on the
real economy of financial frictions and at estimating the effectiveness of sev-
eral macroprudential policies. Their widespread adoption notwithstanding,
surprisingly little quantitative research has been performed so far on the ef-
fects of such policies on the real economy. The key research questions of the
paper are then related to identify the impact on real variables of tensions
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arising in the banking sector and to investigate whether the timely imple-
mentation of macroprudential policies would have helped in mitigating the
real effects of financial crises. In other words, I question whether there exist
a one-size-fits-all macroprudential tool for dealing with financial crises.
I try and answer the above questions by making use of a DSGE model
with a banking sector where financial frictions can bite only occasionally.
This non-linearity within the banking sector should help in principle in iden-
tifying asymmetries in the cycle. It will also help in investigating the behav-
ior of macroprudential policies in a non-linear environment. A further contri-
bution of the paper is technical and is related to the estimation of large non-
linear DSGE models. The model I am dealing with has indeed an occasionally
binding constraint related to financial frictions in the economy; this implies
that the model operates under two regimes: one in which financial frictions
are in place and the other in which the allocation of resources is not affected
by financial constraints. Such non-linearity is introduced to better capture
the interaction between the financial system and the real economy. How-
ever, so far one of the main hurdles for investigating large non-linear models
has been their computational complexity. Here I rely on a method recently
brought forward in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) for solving this class of
models. One of the advantages of this method lies in its computational sim-
plicity, which makes it possible to bring a medium scale model to the data. I
therefore introduce a new estimation technique for DSGE models that does
not rely on the estimation of the likelihood function. This method, that is
gaining popularity in other disciplines, is known as Approximate Bayesian
Computation (ABC, see Beaumont et al. 2002). I show that ABC can be easily
implemented for estimating non-linear DSGE models and it provides sev-
eral advantages compared to other methods currently used in the estimation
of non-linear DSGE models, such as the Simulated Method of Moments. I
show that the non-linear model is better able than linear models to approx-
imate the asymmetries that can be observed in the data. More precisely, the
estimated model accurately replicates the negative skewness of output and
it better matches higher order moments (such as skewness and kurtosis) of
output, consumption and investment.
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Chapter 1
Natural Expectations and Home
Equity Extraction
1.1 Introduction
From 1999 to the end of 2006, U.S. household debt relative to income grew
sharply, from 64 percent to more than 100 percent.1 The increase in debt
was accompanied by a sharp appreciation in housing prices: the Standard &
Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Index soared by 65 per cent in real terms in
the same time span. Unlike previous episodes of heated housing markets,
this housing price boom has been characterized by a surge in households’
home equity extraction (HEE), through cash-out refinancing of mortgages,
second lien home equity loans, or home equity lines of credit (henceforth,
HELOCs). In 1992 the value of HEE was about $41 billion (in 2006 dollars);
at the end of 1999, it more than doubled to about $95 billion; and from 2000 to
2006, when housing price growth was at its peak, HEE almost tripled (Figure
1.1).2 Also, Greenspan and Kennedy (2005) document that households’ gross
home equity extraction as a fraction of disposable income increased from less
than 3 percent to about 10 percent between 1997 and 2005.3
In this paper we propose a novel explanation for the increase in house-
holds’ leverage during a housing price boom in which a wide availability
of financial instruments allows agents to borrow today against the future
1Source: US. Bureau of Economic Analysis (GDP, BEA Account Code: A191RC1) and
Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds (Households and nonprofit organizations; total mort-
gages; liability, id: Z1/Z1/FL153165005.Q).
2Source: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds.
3Other works that have examined the role of home equity-based borrowing include Mian
and Sufi (2011), Disney and Gathergood (2011), and Brown et al. (2013), among others.
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Figure 1.1: Home equity extraction and house prices in the U.S.















Note: This figure displays the flows of home equity extraction (solid blue line, left scale) in the
U.S. in billion of dollars along with the Shiller’ Real Home Price Index (dashed green line, right
scale). Home equity extraction is computed as a four quarters moving average of Gross Equity Ex-
traction divided by the Consumer Price Index. The series, computed according to the methodology in
Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), is available at http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/03/
q4-mortgage-equity-extraction-strongly.html (retrieved 7 August 2014). The Real Home
Price Index is available at the Robert Shiller’s website (http://www.econ.yale.edu/˜shiller/
data.htm, retrieved 7 August 2014).
expected value of their houses. We show that long-run expectations about
future house prices of both households and, especially, financial intermedi-
aries have a large impact on households’ indebtedness. Our story relates
to the work of Fuster et al. (2010) and Fuster et al. (2012) and to the con-
cept of natural expectations. Indeed, these papers build on an asset-pricing
setting in which: (1) fundamentals of the economy are truly hump-shaped,
exhibiting momentum in the short run and partial mean reversion in the long
run, which, however, is hard to identify in small samples; and (2) agents do
not know that fundamentals are hump-shaped and, instead, base their be-
liefs on parsimonious models that fit the available data. We adopt a similar
approach to the housing-credit market, assuming that our economy’s home-
owners take housing prices as given; they derive long-run house price fore-
casts in order to quantify their future housing wealth and to decide how
much equity to extract. Similarly, financial intermediaries need to forecast
future house prices to choose the supply of home equity loans.
Which model do agents use to forecast housing prices? We consider a
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set of parsimonious models that replicate empirically observed patterns in
housing prices. Hence, these models are similar in terms of in-sample fit and
short-run forecasts. However, they differ in their ability to capture the long-
run hump-shaped dynamics that characterize housing prices. We are inter-
ested in assessing how the behavior of agents in the credit market is affected
by natural expectations - that is, the tendency to base forecasts on simplified
models that fail to take into account the long-run mean reversion of house
prices after a positive short-run momentum.4 After all, as shown by Fuster
et al. (2010), long-run mean reversion is a property that is hard to detect in
small samples. Then, using a tractable model of a collateralized credit market
populated by households and banks and calibrated to the recent house price
boom-bust episode, we find that: (1) mild variations in long-run housing
price forecasts result in quantitatively considerable differences in the amount
of home equity extracted during a boom; (2) home equity extraction data are
better matched by models in which agents are fairly natural; (3) the equilib-
rium level of debt and its interest rate are particularly sensitive to financial
intermediaries’ naturalness. Our findings, hence, support the theory of Case
et al. (2012), which highlights the role of future housing price expectations in
explaining cycles in the housing market.5
The assumption that households behave in line with the natural expecta-
tions theory when confronting house prices is largely supported by empirical
work. For example, Goodman and Ittner (1992) surveys the early literature
about the excessive optimism of homeowners in assessing the future values
of their homes and documents that households overestimate home price by
between 4 percent and 16 percent. Homeowners appear to overestimate even
the current value of their houses: Agarwal (2007) considers panel data from
2002 to 2005 and concludes that homeowners overestimate their house value
by on average 3.1 percent. Also, using survey data in the period 2002-2012,
Case et al. (2012) find that households’ forecasts were accurate in the short-
4As in Fuster et al. (2010), for tractability we abstract from learning and give agents a
fixed, simple model estimated using available data. For a model of the Great Recession in
which agents learn about the parameters of financial shocks see Pintus and Suda (2015).
5In this respect, our paper is also in line with Burnside et al. (2011), which show that
boom and bust dynamics in the housing market are affected by “social dynamics” that lead
agents to change beliefs about future housing prices. Other theories proposed in the literature
focus on: growing complacency of lenders in the face of declining loan quality (Mian and Sufi,
2011, Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011); money illusion on the part of homebuyers that led
to flawed comparisons of home purchase prices with rents (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008);
an agency problem afflicting the credit rating agencies (Mathis et al., 2009); and government
failure to regulate an emerging shadow banking system (Gorton, 2010).
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run (one year) but “abnormally high” in the long run (10 years).6 Similar evi-
dence have been documented in Shiller (2007) and Benitez-Silva et al. (2008).
Nevertheless, households are only one side of the housing-related debt mar-
ket. In fact, financial institutions supply credit to households and, if they
did not share the same optimistic forecasts, they would be reluctant to pro-
vide home equity loans at low interest rates. One novelty of this paper is its
insight in documenting that financial experts also had natural expectations
when they made their housing price forecasts - in the sense that they, too,
ignored any form of long-run mean reversion in housing prices after the pos-
itive and strong short-run momentum. Thus, the first contribution of our
paper is to document that financial experts also likely ignored hump-shaped
dynamics of housing prices in their forecasts, and thus wound up being ex-
cessively optimistic about long-run housing price appreciation in the recent
price boom. Specifically, we gather a unique dataset of out-of-sample hous-
ing price forecasts made by a professional forecasting company in the period
1995-2011 and show that these forecasts do not display any sort of adjust-
ment after a period of short-run positive momentum: forecasts made prior
to 2006 predict constant and large increases in long-run housing price un-
til 2030. These findings are in line with other studies about the behavior of
housing market experts during the boom phase.7 We argue, then, that fi-
nancial experts can also be treated as natural agents and that their inability
to account for hump-shaped housing price dynamics affected the supply of
credit during the recent boom.
As a second contribution of the paper, we apply the theory of natural ex-
pectations to the housing market. Specifically, first we show that housing
prices are characterized by hump-shaped dynamics, which imply a large mo-
mentum in the short run and partial mean reversion in the long run. Then,
we compare four models to estimate and forecast housing price dynamics.
We consider two possible dimensions that lead to natural expectations: (1)
an inner tendency of agents to incorporate a small set of explanatory vari-
ables when estimating a model, in line with the findings in Beshears et al.
(2013); and (2) a limited ability of agents to consider a large set of data when
estimating the model, in line with the assumption of extrapolative expecta-
tions applied to the housing market.8 We also consider two rigorous and
6As the authors state: “it may be a general expectation about the vague and distant future
that helps explain why people behaved in the 2000s as if they thought that home prices could
never fall: perhaps they thought so only about the long run, as our 10-year expectations data
seem to confirm”.
7See Foote et al. (2012) and Cheng et al. (2014).
8See Goetzmann et al. (2012), Abraham and Hendershott (1994), Muellbauer and Murphy
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more sophisticated statistical approaches to modeling and forecasting hous-
ing prices, which differ in the information criterion used to select the most ap-
propriate specification. We find that models that incorporate hump-shaped
dynamics are not preferred, in terms of in-sample fit, to more parsimonious
models that ignore long-run mean reversion. As a result, the use of simple
models leading to natural beliefs is fully justifiable in terms of in-sample per-
formance. Finally, we demonstrate that models that have diverse degrees of
ability to capture hump-shaped dynamics in housing price market may dif-
fer in their long-run forecasts, while leading to similar short-run predictions.
Hence, agents that make use of simple models fail to take into account the
partial mean reversion of housing prices in the long run.9
The third contribution of the paper is to link long-run housing price fore-
casts to the optimal behavior of agents in the credit market. We therefore
introduce a tractable model of a collateralized credit market populated by a
representative household and bank. The household can obtain credit from
the bank by pledging its house as collateral.10 In each period, the household
decides how much to consume and how much to borrow and, given the real-
ization of the stochastic exogenous housing price, whether to repay its debt
or to default and lose the ownership of the house. The amount of debt de-
manded crucially depends on the expected realizations of the housing price.
The bank borrows resources at a prime rate and lends them to the household
charging a margin. The bank gains either from debt repayment, in the case of
no default from the household, or from the sale of the housing stock, in the
case of default. Obviously, the banks’ expected future house price is a key
determinant of its supply of credit.
In our quantitative assessment, we are mainly interested in examining the
extent to which the equilibrium level of debt and its price vary with the abil-
ity of agents to take into account possible long run mean-reverting dynamics
of housing prices. Hence, we select a housing price path in our model that
matches the observed dynamics of the aggregate U.S. housing price in the
period 2001-2010, and we vary the specification of the process the agents
use to predict future house prices. We consider a large set of specifications
(fifty) that are identical in terms of the short-run (one-year ahead) forecast,
and in terms of magnitude of the unconditional variance of the housing price
(1997) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2009).
9As discussed in Fuster et al. (2010): “there are several reasons that justify the use of
simple models: they are easy to understand, easy to explain, and easy to employ; simplicity
also reduces the risks of over-fitting”.
10The model is related to Cocco (2005), Yao (2005), Li and Yao (2007), Campbell and Cocco
(2011), and Brueckner et al. (2012).
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process, but that differ in terms of the long-run expectations. Hence, we can
rank the different specifications according to their degree of naturalness: more
natural processes ignore the long-run mean reversion of housing prices and
predict a higher long-run price; less natural processes incorporate a certain
degree of housing price adjustment after the short-run momentum and pre-
dict a lower long-run price. We find four results. First, the model predicts
a positive relationship between the average equilibrium level of debt in the
economy in the boom phase and the degree of naturalness of agents. Intu-
itively, after observing an increase in the house price, a more natural agent
expects a longer-lasting housing price appreciation, which gives stronger in-
centive to demand/supply debt. Second, long-run expectations play a large
role from a quantitative point of view: when the economy is populated by
more natural agents, the debt to income ratio during a boom phase is about
55 percent; when the economy is populated by less natural agents it falls to 35
percent. Recall that the difference in these quantities is solely due to the con-
trasting long-run expectations of housing prices, since by construction agents
have the same short-run expectations in each of the fifty specifications. Third,
we show that the supply-side naturalness is particularly important for the in-
creasing household debt leverage during the housing price boom and for the
interest rate reduction of home equity loans, as documented by Justiniano
et al. (2014). In fact, by conducting a simple experiment where only the bank
or the household (or both) are natural, we highlight that banks’ naturalness
has a larger effect than households’ naturalness in increasing the equilibrium
level of debt in the economy. The intuition for this result stems from the
fact that default in our model is a cost for households but a revenue for the
bank and this cost/revenue is increasing in the expected housing price. As
a last result, using data on Gross Home Equity Extraction as computed in
Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), we show that the simulated process that
better fits the observed debt dynamics during the 2000-2009 episode is char-
acterized by a rather high degree of naturalness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we provide ev-
idence that financial experts’ forecasted future housing prices were not able
to incorporate their long-run downward adjustment after a positive momen-
tum. In section 1.3 we discuss the properties of natural expectations and their
implications for long-run housing price forecasts. In section 1.4 we describe
the theoretical model, and in section 1.5 we describe its calibration. In section
1.6 we discuss the quantitative results of the model. Section 1.7 concludes
and summarizes the main findings.
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1.2 Financial Experts Forecasts
The goal of this paper is to analyze the interaction between housing price
forecasts and private agents’ economic behavior in the credit market. In this
section we provide evidence that models used by financial experts to forecast
future housing prices were not able to incorporate their long-run downward
adjustment after a positive momentum, which led to too optimistic future
housing price expectations. For this reason, it is not unreasonable to consider
financial experts as natural agents, in the sense that, as Fuster et al. (2012)
define, they have ignored the hump-shaped dynamics of the housing price
process that indeed characterize the housing price data, as we document later
in the paper.
Specifically, we analyze a unique data set that contains out-of-sample
forecasts of quarterly housing prices up to a horizon of 30 years, produced
by a professional forecasting company.11 The model used for generating the
forecasts is described as a rich demand-supply model that takes into account
long-term influences on housing prices, such as income trends and demo-
graphics, and cyclical factors such as unemployment and changes in mort-
gage rates. These forecasts begin in 1995 and were updated every quarter
until the end of 2011. We take these forecasts as a proxy for the forecasts made
by financial experts. We believe that since these forecasts were made by a pro-
fessional forecasting company they are not subject to a “bad incentive” bias.
Specifically, Barberis (2013) suggests that financial institutions might have
had incentives to sell real estate financial instruments even when predicting
a coming house price collapse. The fact that our dataset is not provided by
a lending institution rules out the possible problem that these forecasts were
simply strategic statements to sell specific product to clients. Our underlying
assumption is, then, than these forecasts collect what financial experts really
expected about the future evolution of house prices.
Figure 1.2 shows the professional forecasts of a nominal housing price
index for the period 1998-2020.12 In this figure we consider four forecasts
made in the period 1998-2006, before the bust of the housing bubble. The
11This globally recognized professional forecasting company provided us with their nomi-
nal housing price out-of-sample forecasts generated by their models. Unfortunately, the com-
pany was willing to privately disclose to us point estimates only.
12For greater transparency, we plot the nominal house price index because it is the one
directly provided to us by the forecasting company. We have also computed forecasts for real
housing price, by assuming different projections of inflation, such as a constant 2 percent rate,
a constant 1 percent rate, a rate forecasted by linear models. All these scenarios about inflation
lead to very similar figures as the one reported for nominal prices. Hence, we decided to just
show the latter.
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red dotted line represents the forecast made in 2000Q1, the green circled line
represents the forecast made in 2002Q1, the purple dashed line represent the
forecast made in 2004Q1, and the blue dash-dotted line is the forecast made
in 2006Q1.
Figure 1.2: Financial Expert’s Forecasts












Note: This figure displays the realized evolution of the house price index (solid black line) along with the
financial expert forecasts made in different points in time. The four forecasts in the figure were made in
2000Q1 (red dotted line), in 2002Q1 (green circled line ), in 2004Q1 (purple dashed line) and in 2006Q1
(blue dash-dotted line)
As the figure displays, the forecast made in 2000, 2002, and 2004 were
relatively accurate in the short run. Nevertheless, the forecasts computed in
those three years were not able to capture the steep price appreciation that
characterized the period 2000-2007. Furthermore, and most importantly, all
the forecasts were completely unable to predict the large housing price bust
experience in 2006. Notice that the forecasters expected overall constant and
large increases in long-run housing prices for the period 2000-2030.
We argue that these forecasts are consistent with the assumption that pro-
fessional forecasters also failed to take into account any sort of long-run mean
reversion in housing prices.
To support this point, in Table 1.1 we compute the x-quarters ahead fore-
casts for each year in which the forecast was made. We consider both short-
run forecasts (x=1,4,8) and long-run forecasts (x=20,40,80). We normalize
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the housing price in the quarter in which the forecast was made to 100, and
we analyze the dynamics of the forecast in relation to that value. Three
main properties of the forecasts emerge from Table 1.1. First, forecasts made
throughout the period 1995-2006 predicted large housing price appreciation.
Second, the dynamics of the forecasts as a function of the horizon are roughly
independent of the period in which the forecast was made. In fact, all of
the forecasts imply increasingly large appreciations of housing prices over
time: the one-year-ahead forecasts imply increases of 2 percent to almost 4
percent; the five-year-ahead forecasts imply increases of 15 percent to 22 per-
cent; the 10-year-ahead forecasts imply increases of 34 percent to 47 percent;
and the 20-year ahead forecasts imply increases of 79 percent to 113 percent.
Although the magnitude of the forecasted appreciation varies, we argue that
throughout the period 1995-2006 there is no evidence of an adjustment in
terms of housing price forecasts.
Table 1.1: Nominal Growth Forecasted House Price
Forecasts t+ q
q = 1 4 8 20 40 80
t =
1995 103.2 103.8 106.9 119.9 145.8 215.9
1998 100.9 102.8 106.7 119.5 146.5 223.1
2000 100.9 103.3 106.9 120.7 147.4 218.1
2002 100.4 102.8 107.8 121.7 136.9 219.2
2004 100.8 101.9 103.5 114.8 134.0 181.8
2006 100.8 103.5 106.6 116.2 133.9 179.5
Note: This table reports q-quarters ahead normalized forecasts by the professional forecast company
made in the first quarter of the year reported in the first column.
The reported forecasts suggest that it is not unreasonable to assume that
financial experts might also have been exposed to some source of bias that
led them to ignore the mean-reversion component of housing prices growth.
These findings are in line with other studies on the behavior of housing mar-
ket experts during the boom phase. Gerardi et al. (2008) show that ana-
lysts and experts attached a very low probability to a significant reduction
in house prices, while Cheng et al. (2014) find that securitization agents were
on average not aware of the overvaluation of the housing market.13 The op-
timism about house prices is reflected in the risk (and the subsequent losses)
13Interestingly, their study finds that “certain groups of agents - those living in bubblier
areas, working on the sell side, or at firms with greater exposure to subprime mortgages -
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borne by financial intermediaries, which kept the vast majority of second
liens on their balance sheets, while securitizing first-lien mortgages.14
The main conclusion we draw from this section is that professional fore-
casters were most likely making use of models that were not able to capture
any sort of mean reversion in long-run housing price dynamics. In this re-
gard, we can state that financial experts displayed natural expectations, as we
will formally define in the next section. Even though financial experts- unlike
households - commonly make use of large and convoluted models to gener-
ate forecasts, it seems evident that the internal propagation mechanisms of
these models are inadequate to the task of capturing the long-run mean re-
version pattern that characterizes housing prices. In this sense, our evidence
supports the hypothesis proposed by Barberis (2013) that financial experts
used “bad models” for predicting future housing prices and that these mod-
els let them to be too optimistic about future values of collateral. This has
likely affected the supply of credit, as we show in the next sections.
1.3 Natural House Price Expectations
The main goal of this paper is to link the inability of agents to forecast long-
run hump-shaped dynamics of housing prices and the amount of housing-
related debt demanded or supplied. In this section we show three results that
establish this linkage. First, it is, indeed, likely that housing prices are char-
acterized by hump-shaped dynamics, which imply momentum in the short
run and partial mean reversion in the long run. Second, we document that
models that incorporate hump-shaped dynamics are not preferred, in terms
of in-sample fit, to more parsimonious models that ignore long-run mean re-
version. As a result, the use of simple models leading to natural beliefs is
perfectly justifiable in terms of in-sample performance. Third, we demon-
strate that, nevertheless, forecasts based on models with diverse degrees of
ability in capturing the hump-shaped dynamics of housing prices differ over
long-run horizons but not in the short-run. Hence, if agents use simple mod-
els (for a wide range of good reasons15), they fail to forecast the partial mean
may have been particularly subject to potential sources of belief distortions, such as job envi-
ronments that foster group think, cognitive dissonance, or other sources of over-optimism.”
14See for instance Figure 4 from ”Residential Credit Losses - Going into Extra Innings?”
Lehman Brothers U.S. Securitized Products, April 11, 2008 (reprinted in Acharya et al. (2009)),
where it is shown that a relevant fraction of HELOCs and second-liens were kept in the bal-
ance sheets of US banks.
15As Fuster et al. (2010) put: “simple models are easier to understand, easier to explain,
and easier to employ; simplicity also reduces the risks of overfitting. Whatever the mix of
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reversion in housing prices over the long run (this is in line with the pat-
tern shown by the financial experts’ forecasts documented in the previous
section). Following Fuster et al. (2010), we call the resulting beliefs of these
agents natural expectations.
Modeling Natural Expectations for Housing Prices
In this section we examine data on the aggregate real U.S. housing price in-
dex to see how different modeling approaches vary in their ability to capture
hump-shaped long-run dynamics. The series of interest is the quarterly Stan-
dard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Index for U.S. real housing prices in
the sample 1951:1-2010:4. The logarithm of the raw series is plotted in the
upper panel of Figure 1.3. The series displays at least four episodes of boom
and bust: the first one in the early ’70s, the second one later in the decade, the
third one in the ’80s, and, finally, the most recent and significant from 1997 to
2005.
Figure 1.3: Real U.S. Shiller House Price index











Note: This figure plots the Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Index U.S. real housing price index
in its level (upper panel) and growth rate (lower panel).
reasons -pragmatic, behavioral, and statistical- economic agents usually do use simple models
to understand economic dynamics”.
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The series is statistically characterized by the presence of a unit root.16 We
therefore consider as a variable of interest its yearly growth rate, displayed
in the bottom panel of Figure 1.3. Notice also that the growth rate of housing
prices is characterized by relatively long periods positive growth followed by
abrupt declines, which indicate the presence of a rich autocorrelation struc-
ture.
We then assume that the process for housing price growth rate, gt, is au-
toregressive,17 i.e.:
(1− Φp (L)) gt = µ+ εt, (1.1)
where Φp (L) is a lag polynomial of order p, µ is a constant, and εt are iid
innovations.
We assume that an agent could estimate the model in equation (1.1) using
four different criteria that gather a spectrum of different approaches to esti-
mation and forecasting. Initially, we propose two simple models that capture
natural expectations on housing prices. Recall that, as in Fuster et al. (2010),
we define natural expectations as the beliefs of agents that fail to incorporate
hump-shaped long-run dynamics of the fundamentals. We explore two pos-
sible dimensions that lead to natural expectations: (1) a limited ability of agents
to incorporate a large set of explanatory variables when estimating a model;
and (2) a limited ability of agents to consider a large set of data when estimat-
ing the model. Regarding the first model, we assume that an agent naively
considers a first order polynomial, that is p = 1 and Φp (L) = 1 − φ1L when
estimating equation (1.1). This assumption captures behavioral biases, such
as a natural attitude to use over-simplified models, as in Beshears et al. (2013)
and in Hommes and Zhu (2014). We refer to this model as intuitive expecta-
tions, consistently with Fuster et al. (2010). Regarding the second model, we
16To formally test the null hypothesis of presence of a unit root in the house price level,
we run the Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root test. We allowed the regression to incorporate
from 1 to 15 lags. For any of these specifications the test could not reject the null hypothesis
of the presence of a unit root. To check whether the presence of a unit root is driven by the
1997-2007 price boom, we run the test for the shorter sample 1953:1-1996:4. Also in this case,
the Phillips-Perron test could not reject the null hypothesis at a 5 percent significance level for
any model specifications. In addition, there is no statistical evidence that the house price of
growth rate contains unit roots.
17Our modeling choice is justified by Crawford and Fratantoni (2003) who show that linear
(ARMA) models are preferred to non-linear housing price models for out-of-sample forecasts.
As a robustness check, we have alternatively assumed that the housing price growth rate
gt is an ARMA process of the form (1− Φp (L)) gt = µ + (1 + Θq (L)) εt, where Θq (L) is
a lag polynomial of order q. The BIC chooses an ARMA(1,4), whereas the AIC chooses an
ARMA(18,5). The impulse response functions are very similar to the one reported in this
section when assuming an AR process.
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assume that an agent has finite memory and accordingly forecasts the model
in equation (1.1) by considering only the most recent observations. In partic-
ular, we assume that agents consider only the last T lim = 100 observations
when estimating the model.18 The underlying assumption is that agents us-
ing this model do not take into account earlier historical housing price dy-
namics, either because they do not have access to those data, or because they
ignore them, or simply because they assign much lower weight to older ob-
servations. We refer to this model as finite memory.19 Notice that the finite
memory model captures a source of bias that does not emerge because of a
possible model misspecification (as for the intuitive expectations model), but
the bias depends upon the limited amount of information that is relevant for
the agent when estimating the model.20
We then compare the implications of these natural expectations models
with the ones produced by more rigorous and sophisticated statistical ap-
proaches. In fact, an agent could, to the contrary, make use of more sophis-
ticated econometric techniques to estimate the more appropriate lag polyno-
mial in equation (1.1). When choosing how many parameters to include, a
modeler faces a trade-off between improving the in-sample fit of the model
and the risk of overfitting the available data, which may result in poor out-of-
sample forecasts. Two of the most popular criteria are the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). It is not
clear which criterion should be preferred by practitioners in small samples.21
an therefore we retain both, considering as third and fourth models the spec-
ification of equation (1.1) obtained when an econometrician uses respectively
the AIC criterion and the BIC criterion.
In Table 1.2 (left panel for the whole sample 1953:1-2010:4) we report point
estimates (standard errors in brackets) for four models: p = 1, estimated
18We obtain similar results when varying T lim in the range 80-120.
19There are other interpretations for this approach. For example, agents might have
adopted a “new-era thinking”, which referes to agents deliberately excluding less recent ob-
servations because they believe they are not relevant anymore. Alternatively this approach
can also capture the assumption of extrapolative expectations in the housing market em-
ployed by Goetzmann et al. (2012), Abraham and Hendershott (1994), Muellbauer and Mur-
phy (1997), Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), and it relates to the findings of Agarwal (2007) and
Duca and Kumar (2014), which state that younger individuals have statistically significant
more propensity to overestimate house prices and to withdraw housing equity, respectively.
20We assume that the agent with finite memory estimates the model by maximizing infor-
mation criteria. Since the BIC and AIC select the same length for the lag-polynomial, the two
approaches deliver the same results.
21See McQuarrie and Tsai (1998) and Neath and Cavanaugh (1997) for opposing argu-
ments.
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with an intuitive model; p = 6, estimated with a finite memory model; p = 5,
estimated with the BIC model; p = 16, estimated with the AIC model.
19
Table 1.2: Estimation of House Price Growth
Whole Sample: 1953:1-2010:4 Subsample: 1953:1-1996:4










































































































































Note: In this table we report the estimates of the autoregressive process in equation (1.1) when consid-
ering four models. The intuitive expectations model assumes a first order autoregressive process. The
finite memory assumes that the agents estimate the model by using only the most recent 100 observations
and select the order of the lag polynomial by considering the Bayesian Information Criterion. The BIC
and AIC models are estimated by maximizing the two different information criteria when using observa-
tion from the whole sample (1953:1-2010:4) (left panel) and in the subsample (1953:1-1996:4) (right panel).
The real housing price is the annual growth rate of the Shiller index. Standard errors are in brackets.
Significance at 1 percent is indicated by ***, at 5 percent by **, at 10 percent by *.
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Notice that there is a remarkable difference in the number of lags selected
by the last two models: since the BIC criterion largely penalizes overfitting, it
select much fewer lags than the AIC criterion. Furthermore, the large number
of significant parameters for lags greater than one, in particular for the AIC
model, confirms that the process of housing price growth has a relatively rich
autoregressive structure. Consequently, an agent who makes use of a simpler
autoregressive model is likely to ignore important dynamics of house price
growth. The different long-run implications of the models are summarized
by their resulting long-run persistence, as discussed in detail below. No-
tice that these findings are robust to considering only a more limited sample
(1953:1-1996:4) that does not include a recent housing price boom, as reported
on the right panel of Table 1.2.
In-sample Fit and Long-Run Predictions
In the previous section we have reported the estimates of four different spec-
ifications of a linear model for housing price growth. In this section we pro-
vide evidence that, although drastically contrasting in their underlying as-
sumptions, these specifications have similar in-sample properties, and they
are hardly distinguishable from a statistical point of view. Table 1.3 reports
statistics about the goodness of fit of the four models.
Table 1.3: In-Sample Fit and Forecasts
Intuitive finite memory BIC AIC
(p = 1) (p = 6) (p = 5) (p = 16)
RMSE 0.0148 0.0122 0.0122 0.0113
R2 0.9130 0.9713 0.9417 0.9531
R̄2 (adj.) 0.9126 0.9694 0.9404 0.9496
log-likelihood 636.58 682.90 681.14 700.72
p-value LR test (against AR1) 0.13 0.19
One period Ahead Forecast 1.96 2.63 2.33 2.34
Confidence Bands (95%) [1.90; 1.97] [2.31;2.82] [2.18; 2.44] [2.18; 2.48]
Long-Run Persistence (LRP) 23.7 24.4 18.7 10.4
Confidence Bands (95%) [10.3; 31.4] [6.4; 59.5] [8.6; 28.9] [5.1; 17.7]
Note: The top panel of this table reports the in-sample fit statistics for the four models for model for
housing prices (Intuitive expectations, finite memory model, and for the model selected by the BIC and
by AIC). The bottom panel reports statistics regarding the properties of the models about the short-run
forecasts and long-run forecasts.
The Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), the unadjusted coefficient of de-
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termination (R2), and the adjusted coefficient of determination (R̄2) are very
similar across the models.22 Since the intuitive model, the BIC model, and the
AIC model are all nested models, we can formally test whether the data can
formally reject the null hypothesis that the three models are observationally
similar by comparing the log-likelihood evaluated at the unrestricted model
parameter estimates and the restricted model parameter estimates. As Table
1.3 displays, the resulting Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistics when assum-
ing that the restricted model corresponds to p = 1 and the unrestricted model
corresponds to p = 5 and p = 16, respectively, confirm that the models can-
not be distinguished on the basis of goodness-of-fit alone. Since the finite
memory model considers a different sample, it cannot be nested in the other
three models. Hence, the LR test cannot be performed. Nevertheless, notice
that its likelihood is very similar to the one of the other three models. Notice,
too, that the one-quarter-ahead forecasts produced by these models are also
similar.
Although the models imply a similar fit to the data and similar short-run
predictions, their long-run out-of sample forecast implications are different.
We can observe these features of the models by plotting the impulse response
functions for a 1 percent positive shock in the housing price growth rate, as
displayed in the top panel of Figure 1.4.
The intuitive model (solid blue line) estimates a very persistent process,
as indicated by the value of the parameter of the AR(1) process, equal to
0.96 as reported in Table 1.2. Consequently, it predicts a long-lasting posi-
tive effect of a shock on housing price growth. In contrast, the BIC model
(dashed red line) and the AIC model (dotted green line) predict larger short-
run responses of housing prices, but they estimate faster reversions after 10-
15 quarters. Notice, also, that the practitioner who uses the AIC criterion
estimates a negative medium-run response of price-growth after the large
boom, but even this model does not particularly succeed of incorporating a
large mean reversion component of house price. This fact shows that it is
hard to obtain mean-reversion dynamics even with more sophisticated mod-
els when estimated in small samples. Finally, the finite memory model (dotted
purple line) has a very large short-run response and implies a persistence of
the positive shock for about 30 quarters, without any sort of mean reversion.
We can obtain insights about the different long-run predictions of the
models by plotting the impulse responses of the level of the housing prices,
22Although we do not report them here, the historical in-sample fitted values of the four
models are basically indistinguishable. Therefore, they the different empirical models have a
very similar ability to capture the in-sample boom-and-bust episodes.
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Figure 1.4: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions













Note: This figure reports the impulse response function (IRF) of housing price growth rate (upper panel)
and housing price level (lower panel) to a positive unitary shock. The solid blue line represents the IRF
implied by agents that estimate an AR(1) process for the housing price growth rate (intuitive model). The
solid-dotted purple line represents the IRF implied by an agents that estimate a process for the housing
price growth rate when using only the last 100 observations (finite memory model). The dotted red line
represents the IRF for an agent that maximizes the Bayesian Information Criterion and, hence, estimates
an AR(5) process for the housing price growth rate. The green dashed line represent the IRF for an agent
that maximizes the Akaike Information Criterion and, hence, estimates an AR(16) process for the housing
price growth rate.
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as displayed in the lower panel of Figure 1.4. These responses are given by
the cumulative sum of the impulse responses of the growth rate. An agent
using the finite memory model (dotted purple line) predicts that, after a posi-
tive shock, housing prices will largely increase for about 25-30 quarters and
then stabilize at a high level. An agent using the intuitive model (solid blue
line) expects a longer persistence of housing price appreciation, which leads
to a similar long-run forecasts as with the finite memory model. The two more
sophisticated models (BIC model, dashed red line, and AIC model, dotted
green line) predict a much lower degree of persistence, which leads to lower
expected long-run prices. In fact, they prove better in capturing the mean-
reversion feature of housing prices than both the intuitive model and the finite
memory model. Notice also, that an econometrician using the AIC criterion
expects a depreciation following the initial boom. Furthermore, since the
four models are hardly distinguishable in the sample, as pointed out above,
it is legitimate to conjecture that these impulse responses are associated with
a large degree of uncertainty. Not surprisingly, this is indeed the case, as
described in Appendix 1.8.
The long-run dynamics of housing prices are particularly important for
the purpose of this paper. In fact, we conjecture that households’ consumption-
saving decisions are affected by the perceived long-run housing wealth. This
presumption is motivated by the long durability of housing as an asset, and
by the nature of home equity loans, which have repayment periods of up
to 25 years. It is therefore reasonable to assume that long-run forecasts of
housing prices matter for households’ present decisions. A measure of the
long-run price estimated after a shock is the long-run persistence of the price
level, defined as the long run steady state level after a 1 percent shock. Given
that the price level is assumed to follow an ARIMA(p,1,0) model, the long-







where φj , j = 1, ..., p are the coefficients of the lag polynomial of order p,
Φp (L). Table 1.3 reports the LRP of the processes estimated by the four mod-
els as well as their confidence band.
As Table 1.3 reports, the LRP estimated with an intuitive model is larger
than the one estimated by agents using a more rigorous statistical approach.
In particular, the AR(1) model delivers a long-run persistence that is 30 per-
cent higher than the AR(5) model selected by the BIC, and 80 percent higher
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than the AR(16) model selected by the AIC.23 Also, the LRP estimated by the
finite memory model is similar to the one estimated by the intuitive model.
This an important result since it shows that agents who use oversimplified
models (because of behavioral biases or sample selection) tend to have more
optimistic expectations about long-run housing price resulting after a posi-
tive shock than agents using more sophisticated models. In Table 1.7 in Ap-
pendix 1.9 we report similar results obtained when considering annual data,
confirming that our findings are not an artifact of data frequencies.
1.4 A Model for Home Equity Loans and Natural
Expectations
In this section we propose a model in which a representative household and a
representative bank interact in a market for home equity loans. Importantly,
we allow agents to have a range of expectations upon the evolution of the
exogenous housing price that varies with the ability of agents to incorporate
long run mean reversion of house prices. Hence, the expectations vary from
more natural (lower ability to incorporate long-run mean reversion) to less
natural (greater ability to incorporate long-run mean reversion). Our theo-
retical model can be used as a laboratory to investigate the extent to which
naturalness of households and banks has affected the level of debt in the econ-
omy during the housing price boom.
Household
The economy lasts T < ∞ periods and is populated by two representative
agents: a household and a bank. There are a non-storable consumption good
and two assets: housing and debt claims. The household starts at t = 0
with an endowment of housing stock h worth p0h, where pt denotes the real
housing price at time t, and the household is allowed to sell the house only
in the final period, at a price pT , unless it decides to default in any time t =
1, ..., T −1. In case of default, the household loses the ownership of the house
and becomes a renter. Since the household starts with an owned housing
stock and with no previous debt, and it does not engage in buying or selling
23As already stated, aa robustness check, we have alternatively assumed that the hous-
ing price growth rate gt is an ARMA process. The BIC and the AIC pick respectively an
ARMA(1,4), and an ARMA(18,5). Since the LRP (18.6 for ARMA(1,4) and 12.9 for the ARMA
(18,5)) and the Impulse Response functions are very similar to the one estimated with the AR
processes we decided to present only the latter.
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its housing stock, we can interpret the debt claims in the economy as home
equity extraction. We assume that the household is endowed in each period
with a constant income yt = y > 0. The housing price is an exogenous
variable for the agents in our economy.24
Subject to the repayment of debt accumulated in the past, in period t the
household is allowed to borrow new debt dt which it will eventually repay
in the next period at an interest rate of rt. The household has the option of
defaulting from t = 1 onwards. Hence, the budget constraint of a household
that repays its debt at time t is:
ct + (1 + rt−1)dt−1 = y + dt;
whereas, the budget constraint of a household that decides to default at time
t is:
ct + γpth = y,
where γpth represents the renting cost, which is assumed, for simplicity, to
be a fraction γ of the house’s value.





subject to the period-by-period budget constraint, which is conditional on the
default decision. Later, we will discuss in depth how agents’ expectations
are formed. In each period the household’s choice defines a debt demand
schedule dt (rt) and a related default decision.
We can rewrite the problem recursively and solve it by backward induc-
tion. Let us then start from period t = T : if the household has never de-
faulted in the past, in the last period it is entitled to sell its housing stock;
hence the only decision variable is whether to default or not to default. Since
the household sells the housing stock in the last period, there is no possibil-
ity of getting new debt, and, thus, consumption is simply determined by the
exogenous income and housing value.
In case of a good credit history (i.e. no past default), the problem in period
T can be then written as:
V ∗T (rT−1, dT−1, pT ) = max {u (y − γpTh) ;u (y − (1 + rT−1)dT−1 + pTh)} .
24This simplifying assumption is justified by this paper’s goal of understanding how dif-
ferent expectations about the evolution of housing prices affect agents’ economic behavior and
is used in several studies on the effects of housing on macroeconomic or financial decisions,
as in Campbell and Cocco (2011) or Cocco (2005).
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Provided that the household did not default in the past, it has the option of
defaulting in periods t = 1, ..., T −1. Hence, for t = 1, ..., T −1 the household
has to compare two value functions: if it decides to default (or did so in the
past), the value function writes:
V Dt (pt) = u (y − γpth) + βEtV Dt+1 (pt+1) ,
with dτ = 0 for τ ≥ t. In the event that the household did not default in the
past and is not defaulting in the current period t, the value function writes
instead:
V Ct (rt−1, dt−1, pt) = max
dt
[
u (y − (1 + rt−1)dt−1 + dt) + βEt
{
V ∗t+1 (rt, dt, pt+1)
}]
.
Hence, in each period t = 1, ..., T − 1, the household compares the two
value functions to pin down its default choice:
V ∗t (rt−1, dt−1, pt) = max
{
V Dt (pt) ;V
C
t (rt−1, dt−1, pt)
}
.
Finally, in period t = 0 there is no default choice, since the household is
assumed to start with no debt; hence in t = 0 its value function reads:
V ∗0 (p0) = max
d0
[u (y + d0) + βEt {V ∗1 (r0, d0, p1)}] ,
with the initial stock of debt d−1 = 0 given.
Bank
The bank seeks to maximize its intertemporal stream of profits, taking into
account the probability of the household’s default. In each period the bank
obtains loans from outside the model at a risk-free rate, it and supplies credit
to the household, at a market interest rate rt. In case of default, the bank
obtains revenues from liquidating the household’s housing stock. The bank’s
problem can also be expressed in recursive form. Let’s start from the last
period, t = T . The profits for the bank write:





(1 + rT−1)dT−1 − (1 + iT−1)dT−1 if the household does not default
(and did not default in the past)
κpTh− (1 + iT−1)dT−1 if the household defaults
(but did not in the past)
0 if the household defaulted
in the past.
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Here κ represents the fraction of the collateral that the bank can recover after
the household’s default.
For a given interest rate rt, in periods t = 1, ..., T − 1 the bank sets dt in
such a way as to maximize its profits:
max
dt





(rt−1 − it−1)dt−1 + δEtπt+1 (rt, dt, pt+1) if the household does not default
(and did not default in the past)
κpth− (1 + it−1)dt−1 if the household defaults
(but did not in the past)
0 if the household defaulted
in the past.
By assumption, the bank cannot default on its obligations. Finally, the profit
function in t = 0 writes:
π0 (p0) = δE0π1 (r0, d0, p1) .
Recursive equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium in our economy can be defined, for t = 0, ..., T −1, as
an interest rate function rt(pt, dt−1, rt−1), a debt function dt(pt, dt−1, rt−1) and
value functions V Dt (pt), V
C
t (rt−1, dt−1, pt) and πt (rt−1, dt−1, pt) such that in
each period t = 0, ..., T − 1 and for each realization of the housing price pt
and realizations of rt−1 and dt−1:
• given rt, dt(pt, dt−1, rt−1) and value functions V Dt (pt), V Ct (rt−1, dt−1, pt)
solve the household recursive maximization problem.
• given rt and providing that no default has occurred up to period t,
dt(pt, dt−1, rt−1) and the profit function πt (rt−1, dt−1, pt) solve the bank
maximization profit.
• markets for the consumption good and debt clear.
In period t = T the household maximizes its utility under the budget
constraint, choosing whether or not to default.
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Expectation Formation
In our model we treat housing prices as exogenous and assume that the
growth rate of the housing price follows a stochastic process. Accordingly,
given a price of housing in the initial period, p0, the evolution of the house







(1−Θp(L)) rht+1 = σεt+1, (1.2)
Here, rht+1 denotes the growth rate of housing price, Θ
p(L) is a lag polynomial
of order p > 1, and εt+1 is a mean-zero stochastic variable. This specification
links the expectation of future house price growth rate to the autoregressive





As it will be clear next section, we examine the predictions of the model when
varying the form of perceived expectation on future house prices by varying
the properties of the lag polynomial Θp(L).
1.5 Calibration
By using the model described in the previous section, we now assess the
quantitative effects of natural expectations in the consumption/saving deci-
sion. We are mainly interested in examining the extent to which the equi-
librium level of housing-related debt and its price vary with the ability of
agents to take into account possible long-run mean-reverting dynamics of
house prices.
We consider an economy that lasts T=10 periods (years). The length
of the simulation is a computationally restricted parameter, since in a non-
stationary model the number of state-variables quickly explodes when in-
creasing the number of periods in the model.25 However, a 10-period time
span is appealing for two reasons. First, it is long enough to fully capture a
boom-bust episode such as the one observed in the U.S. housing market in
25Campbell and Cocco (2011), one of the closest models to ours, is simulated over a 20-
years span. However, in order to keep the state space confined, they consider a iid housing
price growth process, approximated by a bimodal Markov process. By reducing the length of
the simulation to 10 periods, we are able to consider richer housing price dynamics, allowing
for an autoregressive process approximated by a tri-modal Markov process.
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the 2000s. Second, the majority of HELOCs started during the boom years
had a duration of around 10 years.26
We conduct the following experiment. We feed the model with a given
path of housing prices for 10 periods, which aims to replicate the boom-bust
episode as experienced in the U.S. in the period 2001-2010. Then, we vary
the agents’ beliefs about the process generating the observed evolution of
housing prices. Therefore, after observing the same initial housing price ap-
preciation, different beliefs about the housing price data generating process
affect the agents’ optimal economic behavior.
The imposed evolution of housing price (solid line) is displayed in Figure
1.5.
Figure 1.5: Simulated house price dynamics







Note: This figure plots the housing price series fed into the model (black solid line) along with the actual
realization of the annualized Shiller index from 2001 to 2010 (dotted line). The Shiller index has been
rescaled and set equal to 1 in 2004.
Ultimately, we assume that agents in our model always observe the same
evolution of housing prices and they rely on an autoregressive specification
for the housing price growth rate in equation (1.2) of the form:
rht+1 = Θ
p(L)rht + σεt+1,
where Θp(L) is a lag polynomial of order p > 1. To investigate the impact
of different forms of expectations, we consider a large set of specifications of
26From the Semiannual Risk Perspective From the National Risk Committee, U.S. Depart-
ment of Treasury, 2012, it can be inferred that this portion was equal to at least 58 percent of
loans outstanding in 2012.
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Θp(L) that generate forecasts that are similar in the short run but different
in the long run. It is important to note that we are completely silent about
the true process that generated the observed housing price series as this is
outside the scope of our analysis. In fact, in the empirical sections above,
we showed that a large set of theoretical processes are consistent with the
observed historical housing price time series. I
Calibrating Expectations
We consider 50 specifications for the model in equation (1.2) to generate
agents’ expectations of future housing prices. This large number of speci-
fications allows us to investigate how macroeconomic variables respond to
rather small differences in expectation formation. For computational feasi-
bility, we limit our investigation to processes of order two, i.e.:
rht+1 = µ(1− θ1 − θ2) + θ1rht + θ2rht−1 + σεt+1. (1.3)
Two important remarks about the choice of a second order autoregressive
process are in order. First, considering a parsimonious process is paramount
from computational reasons. Recall that our model is non-stationary and
therefore we need to keep track of the value functions in each period. Adding
more lags to the process will exponentially increase the number of state vari-
ables. Second, and more importantly, the AR(2) specification is flexible enough
to capture features of the U.S. housing price index observed during the last
boom-bust episode, and, above all, it allows us to incorporate different de-
grees of ability to embody hump-shaped dynamics.
As a result, each specification is a function of four parameters: µ, θ1, θ2, σ.
We assume that the average growth rate of housing prices, µ, is known, and
it is constant across each specification. In particular, we fix µ = 0, which is
consistent with the historical average growth rate of the real Shiller index be-
tween 1953 and 2000, which is equal to 0.00016. We make use of three criteria
to pin down the remaining three parameters (θ1, θ2, σ) for each specification.
First, each specification should produce the same short-run (one-year-ahead)
forecasts. This assumption is motivated by the evidence in Case et al. (2012),
which find that, in the short run, homebuyers were generally well informed,
that their short-run expectations were not largely different from the actual
realized home prices, and that most of the root causes of the housing bubble
can be reconnected to their long-term home price expectations. Also this as-
sumption is motived by the fact that natural expectations are able to capture
short-run momentum, but fail to predict more subtle long-run mean rever-
sion. Second, each specification should imply the same unconditional vari-
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ance. As a consequence, the different behavior implied by each specification
does not depend upon the magnitude of the housing-price variance, but only
upon its propagation. Third, and most important, each specification should
be characterized by different long-run forecasts. As a result, each specifica-
tion differs only by the degree by which it is able to capture some sort of
long-run mean reversion, when keeping fixed the short-run predictions and
the overall variance of the process. Specifically, we set the first order autore-
gressive parameter, θ1, to be equal to 0.6, which is the persistence of an AR(1)
process estimated using the Case-Shiller index annual growth rate. Since the
one-step-ahead forecasts of an AR(2) process is only a function of θ1, each
specification implies the same one-year forecast. The long-run predictions
of a model can be summarized by its long-run persistence (LRP). When con-
sidering annual data (see Table 1.7 in Appendix 1.9), the LRP estimate range
from the 1.5 (as estimated by the AIC model) to 2.8 (as estimated with the
intuitive model). As Table 1.7 displays, there is a substantial degree of un-
certainty around the estimated LRP. To capture this uncertainty, we consider
specifications for process in (1.3) such that their LRP ranges between 1.4 and
4.5. The values of LRP in this range pin down the different values of θ2. Fi-
nally, the parameter σ is set to such that all specifications imply a constant
standard deviation equal to the estimated value from Case-Shiller index an-
nual growth rate (0.049). This approach allows us to isolate the effects of
a change in the perceived persistence of the house price growth rate pro-
cess from changes in its perceived unconditional variance. Table 1.4 reports
the resulting calibration for six specifications of the model in equation (1.2)
among the 50 that we consider in our simulation, together with the implied
long-run persistence.
Table 1.4: Calibration of some processes
Process LRP θ1 θ2 σ
1 1.4 0.6 -0.31 0.041
10 1.93 0.6 -0.12 0.041
20 2.51 0.6 0.002 0.039
30 3.10 0.6 0.08 0.037
40 3.73 0.6 0.13 0.035
50 4.48 0.6 0.18 0.033
Note: This table reports the long-run persistence (LRP), the two autoregressive parameters (θ1 and θ2)
and the standard deviation (σ) for six out of the 50 specifications of model as in (1.2).
Notice that the degree of naturalness of an agent is driven by the second
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order autoregressive parameter, θ2: when this parameter is negative, agents
are not natural since they expect a long-run mean reversion of housing prices
after a positive short-run momentum; when θ2 is positive, agents are natural
since they expect the short-run momentum to persist in the long-run.
Figure 1.6 displays the impulse response functions and their cumulative
values for three of the above-described processes. More precisely, we plot
the IRFs and CIRFs of the AR(1) process (cross-line), as a reference, along
with the two “extreme”’ processes: process 1 (solid line) representing the
process with the lowest degree of naturalness and which accordingly displays
the strongest long-run mean reversion; process 50 (triangle-line) representing
the process with highest degree of naturalness. Notice that the forecasted
long-run price by process 50 is almost double the one implied by an AR(1)
process.
Figure 1.6: IRFs and CIRFs for selected processes








Least natural AR1 Most natural
Note: This figure plots the impulse response functions for the housing price growth rate (top-panel) and
level (bottom panel) for three different processes used to solve the model: the one characterizing the most
natural agents (green-triangle line), the AR1 model (blue-star line), and the one characterizing the least
natural agents (black-solid line).
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Calibration of Structural Parameters
The calibrated structural parameters of the model and their values are re-
ported in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5: Calibration of structural parameters
Parameter Value Description
β, δ 0.98 Discount rate for household and banks
h 1.5 Housing stock
η 2 CRRA coefficient
y 1 Income per year
γ 5% Rental rate as a fraction of house value
κ 20% Collateral value for the bank as a fraction of house value
We set the discount rate for both the household and the bank at 0.98,
which is consistent with an annual risk-free rate of 2 percent. The housing
stock, h, can be interpreted as the housing value in the initial period, since
we set the initial housing price p equal to one. Hence, h relates to the housing
value to income in 2000. This value is equal to 2.1 in the Survey of Consumer
Finance data, whereas it is equal to 1.3 when considering national aggregate
data. Hence, we set h to be equal to the intermediate value of 1.5. We assume
a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, i.e. u(c) = c
1−η−1
1−η ,
with coefficient of risk aversion η equal to 2, a value broadly in line with the
literature. Annual income, y, is standardized at the level of 1. We assume
that the rental rate, γ, is 5 percent of the current value of the housing stock,
thus implying a price-to-rent ratio equal to 0.05, which is consistent with the
setting in Garner and Verbrugge (2009) and in Hu (2005). Finally, we assume
that when the household defaults, the bank is able to recover only 20 percent
of the value of the house. Such a value is in line with our interpretation of
the asset in the economy as an HELOC.27
1.6 Quantitative Effects of Natural Expectations
Given the calibration of the structural parameters, the 50 specifications of
the housing price growth process used by agents to forecast future hous-
ing prices, and the realized evolution of housing price for the 10 periods, as
27Since HELOCs are junior-liens, and the maximum loan-to-value ratio for a first-lien is 80
percent, we are then implicitly assuming that the bank is able to fully recover the value of the
equity in the house sale.
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shown in Figure 1.5, we can compute the equilibrium dynamics of the vari-
ables of the model. Specifically, we are interested in the debt-to-income ratio,
d
y
, the consumption-to-income ratio, c
y
, the loan-to-value ratio, d
ph
, and the
interest rate associated with home equity loans, rt. We now investigate how
these variables vary with agents’ naturalness in the housing price boom and
bust, separately.
Equilibrium in a boom
Figure 1.7 reports the average values of debt (upper left panel), LTV ratio
(upper right panel), consumption (lower left panel) and interest rate (lower
right panel) for each of the 50 specifications of expected housing price growth
(x-axis) across the boom phase (from period 1 to period 6 in our model, which
corresponds to the period 2000-2005 in the data, blue solid line) and across
the bust (from period 7 to period 9 in our model, which corresponds to the
period 2007-2009 in the data, green dashed line). As a reference point, we
denote with a red circle the values associated with assuming the agents form
expectations using an AR(1) process, which relates to the intuitive statistical
model as presented in Section 1.3. First, we consider the average values of
our variables of interest during the boom phase.
Four results are worth highlighting. First, the model predicts a positive
relationship between the average equilibrium level of debt in the economy
in the boom phase and the degree of naturalness of agents. Recall that the
50 specifications for the expectations range from higher ability of the model
to incorporate long-run mean reversion (specification 1, low naturalness) to
lower ability of the model to incorporate long-run mean reversion (specifi-
cation 50, high naturalness). Intuitively, after observing an increase in the
housing prices, a more natural agent expects a longer-lasting appreciation
of housing prices, which gives higher incentive to demand/supply debt. In
contrast, a less natural agent expects a short-run momentum in housing prices
followed by a mean reversion adjustment after some periods, as it can be vi-
sualized by the impulse response function for specification 1 in Figure 1.6.
As a result, the household is less willing to demand debt and the bank is less
willing to supply it. A second important result relates to the role of long-
run expectations. Notice when agents in the economy are characterized by
the lowest degree of naturalness, the equilibrium level of debt is roughly 35
percent of income. In contrast, when the agents ignore hump-shaped dy-
namics of housing prices, the equilibrium level of debt in the economy esca-
lates to 55 percent of income. We obtain a similar pattern when considering
the loan-to-value ratio, which increases from 18 percent for the least natural
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Figure 1.7: Boom and bust dynamics for selected processes



































Note: This figure displays the average values of debt-to-income (upper left panel), LTV ratio (upper right
panel), consumption-to-income (lower left panel) and interest rate (lower right panel) for each of the fifty
specifications of expected house price growth. The values displayed in the figure have been interpolated
by a 3rd degree polynomial. The x-axis reports the number of each process, from the least (process 1) to
the most (process 50) natural. Average values are computed both across the boom phase (from period 1 to
period 6 in our model, which correspond to the period 2000-2006 in the data, blue solid line) and across
the bust (from period 7 to period 9 in our model, which corresponds to the period 2007-2009 in the data,
green dashed line). The red nodes in each panel represents the level of debt of the AR(1) process.
agents to 28 percent for the most natural agents. The pronounced differences
in these quantities is solely due to the contrasting long-run expectations of
housing prices, since by construction agents have the same short-run expec-
tations in each of the 50 specifications. These results strongly support the
argument in Case et al. (2012): the role of homebuyers’ long-run housing
price expectations is a crucial determinant of agents’ behavior in terms of the
consumption/saving choice. As a third result, notice that the accumulation
of debt fuels consumption in the short-run, since there is positive correlation
among average consumption in a boom phase and the degree of naturalness
of agents in the economy. Intuitively, when expecting higher future appreci-
ation of house’s price, the resulting wealth effect provides incentives to con-
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sume in the current period. As a forth result, notice that debt is associated
with a lower interest rate in economies where agents are more natural. In-
tuitively, since banks in the model share the same form of expectations of
households, when banks expect both short-run and long-run momentum in
housing prices, they are willing to lend at a lower equilibrium price.
The above findings can be summarized as follows: when housing prices
start to increase, a natural agent (a household or a bank) overestimates the
persistence of positive shocks and ignores the possible long-run mean rever-
sion that follows a short-run momentum. As a consequence, the household
or bank also overestimates the overall long-run appreciation of the housing
stock. Given the availability of financial instruments to smooth future hous-
ing wealth, a natural household has, then, more incentive to extract a large
portion of home equity to increase its consumption immediately. A natural
bank will then be willing to provide loans to the household at lower price. As
a result, natural expectations leads to large leverage during a housing price
boom.
Equilibrium in a bust
The second set of results concerns the adjustment that the economy makes
during the house price bust (periods from 6 to 9). These results reflect the
predictions of our model for the behavior of agents in the period 2007-2009
and they show that the relationships between debt, consumption and degree
of naturalness described above for the boom period are reversed. More natural
households deleverage their debt position and they drastically reduce their
consumption. Specifically, in the economies with most natural agents (pro-
cesses 47-50), the amount of debt the household is able to extract is null.28
Although quite drastic, this result is in line with evidence regarding the prac-
tice of HELOC freezes observed since 2008, when financial institutions real-
ized the depth of the bust (WSJ, 2008). Notice that the adjustment if house-
holds were less natural households would be less sharp: they reduce their
consumption to a lower degree and they are still allowed to borrow to smooth
consumption, since they have previously accumulated relatively low levels
of debt during the boom phase.
28Such sharp dynamics in the deleveraging process may be due to the absence of frictions
(e.g. adjustment costs) in lending: in case of an abrupt decline in collateral values, banks in our
model suddenly cut-off lending. However, note that in the above calibration in equilibrium
the household never reaches the default region.
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The role of bank’s expectations
In Section 1.2 we documented that financial experts are likely to have held
natural expectations during the housing price boom of the early 2000s, since
their forecast do not show any long-run mean reversion after the short-run
momentum. Since our theoretical model accounts for both the demand and
supply of credit, we can now assess the impact of debt-supply naturalness
on macroeconomic variables of interest. Specifically, we now perform some
experiments to identify the contribution of banks’ and households’ expecta-
tions on the equilibrium outcome of debt and interest rate under the follow-
ing four competing hypotheses: (a) both the bank and the household hold
strongly natural expectations; (b) the bank and the household do not hold nat-
ural expectations; (c) only the household is strongly natural, while the bank
is not; (d) only the bank is strongly natural, while the household is not. In
these experiments, for simplicity, we give the natural label to an agent that
forecasts future housing prices using the most natural process (process 50),
and we give the non-natural label to an agent that forecasts future housing
prices using the least natural process (process 1). These extreme values are
vehicles for understanding the role of expectations in regards to supply and
demand. Table 1.6 displays the results.
Table 1.6: Debt dynamics under different assumptions
Boom Bust
Debt Rate Debt Rate
a) Bank and Household natural 54.5 2.2 0.0 -
b) None natural 35.0 2.5 13.9 2.0
c) Only Household natural 36.2 2.8 9.2 2.1
d) Only Bank natural 42.2 2.1 5.1 2.0
Note: This table reports the simulated average level of debt and interest rate across the boom phase (left
panel, from period 1 to period 6 in our model, which correspond to the period 2000-2006) and bust phase
(right panel, from period 1 to period 6 in our model, which correspond to the period 2000-2006 in the
data) under the hypothesis that both the bank and household are natural (a), both bank and household
are not natural (b), only the household is natural (c), and only the bank is natural (d). In this exercise, for
simplicity, we assume that a natural agent uses process 50 to make forecasts, whereas a non natural agent
uses process 1.
The most striking result of our experiment reflects the crucial importance
of banks’ expectations for the equilibrium level of debt. Let’s analyze first
the boom phase. When both agents are not natural, as in scenario (b), the
equilibrium level of debt in the economy is relatively low (around 35 percent
of income). If we assume that only the household is natural, as in scenario
(c), the equilibrium level of debt increases by only 5 percent, whereas if only
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the bank is natural, as in scenario (d), the equilibrium level of debt increases
up to 48 percent. In other words, without assuming a bank expectation chan-
nel, a model in which only households are natural can only replicate a small
portion of the leverage level in the economy during the house price boom.
The intuition for this result stems from the fact that default in our model is
a cost for households but a revenue for the bank and this cost/revenue is in-
creasing in the expected housing price. Hence, the feature of the model that
allows banks to seize a fraction of the households’ housing stock, a rather
realistic assumption, makes the debt supply’s schedule particularly sensitive
to financial intermediaries’ long-run expectation about housing prices.
Estimating Naturalness from the Data
Finally, we perform a comparison of our simulations with the debt-dynamics
observed in the data to pin down which degree of naturalness better fits the
debt data. The first step is to obtain a series that is comparable to the debt-to-
income ratio as simulated in our model. We first consider the annualized
series of Gross Home Equity Extraction in the U.S., as in Greenspan and
Kennedy (2005).29 The series is available only until to 2008Q4. We divide
the series by nominal disposable personal income to compute the debt-to-
income ratio. Because the series is not directly comparable to the outcome of
our simulated model, we need to correct the former for the fraction of house-
holds effectively extracting home equity. Therefore, we make use of the Sur-
vey of Consumer Finance data to compute the fraction of households with an
outstanding HELOC and interpolate via cubic splines for the years in which
the survey is not available. Such a percentage varies from 2.7 per cent in 2001
to 4.6 per cent in 2008. We then compare the resulting debt-to-income series
with the debt dynamics of the model (where both household and bank can be
natural) across the 50 specifications and we select the process whose debt dy-
namics minimize the Euclidean distance with the data. Figure 1.8 plots the
selected process (black solid line) and the debt-to-income ratio in the data
(red circled line). The selected specification is process 31, a fairly persistent
and natural one, since its second order autoregressive parameter is positive,
θ2 = 0.08, and its LRP is fairly large, equal to 3.15. Notice that the implied
LRP is even higher that the one estimated on yearly data with the intuitive
model (se Table 1.7 in Appendix 1.9). To remark the importance of bank’s
naturalness, in the same figure we plot the simulated path of debt under the
29The series is the sum of (a) cash-outs resulting from refinancings, (b) originations to fi-
nance purchases of existing homes minus sellers’ debt cancellation, and (c) changes in home
equity debt outstanding less unscheduled repayments on regular mortgage debt outstanding.
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scenario in which only the household is natural (its expectation follow the
estimated process 31) and the bank is not natural (its expectation follows the
least natural process 1). It can be observed that in order to closely match the
data having a natural household is not enough: we need a significant degree
of naturalness both on the household and on the bank side.
Figure 1.8: Actual v. simulated data














Household natural - Counterfactual
Note: The black solid line in this figure displays the ratio of gross Home Equity Extraction over Personal
Disposable Income, weighted by the fraction of households with an active HELOC (source: Survey of
Consumer Finance). The y-axis (debt to income ratio) is measured as absolute deviation from 2000 (which
corresponds to our initial date t = 0 in the model). The red circled line is the simulated debt path arising
from process 31, which is the process that minimize the Euclidian distance between the data and the
dynamics of debt predicted by our model when varying the degree of naturalness of the agents (process 1
to 50). The green-dashed line represents the debt dynamics under the assumption that only the household
is natural (process 31) but the bank is not natural (process 1). Sources: Greenspan and Kennedy (2005),
FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and SCF.
1.7 Conclusion
The recent financial crisis has served as a reminder of the potential danger
caused by undisciplined collateralized debt markets. In this paper, we use
home equity extraction as a case study to explore the distortions arising from
natural expectations about future values of collateral. We show that natural
expectations arose during the period of the recent housing price boom be-
cause of the failure of households and financial experts to take into account
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the complex structure of house prices. We show that agents may end up over-
estimating long-run prices if they make use of models that fail to capture the
rich autocorrelation structure of housing prices and its mean-reverting com-
ponent. While the notion that households are likely to misestimate house
prices has been documented in the literature, in this paper we provide ev-
idence that financial experts also were too optimistic about long-run prices
before and during the recent house price boom. Specifically, out-of-sample
forecasts gathered from a professional forecaster largely overestimated long-
run prices and did not capture any long-run mean reversion after the posi-
tive short-run momentum. We show the quantitative implications of natural
expectations in a model where households and banks interact through a col-
lateralized financial instrument. We feed the model with a set of expectations
that differ in their ability to capture hump-shaped housing price dynamics.
We document that after a positive shock on housing prices, less natural agents
expect a lower persistence of the shock. In contrast, natural agents overesti-
mate the persistence of the process, thus leading to overly optimistic long-run
forecasts. We then simulate the model by considering housing price dynam-
ics as observed during the 2000s. Our models predict a positive relationship
between the amount of home equity extracted in a boom phase and the de-
gree of naturalness of the agents in the credit market, while at the same time
stressing the prominence of banks’ expectations in the equilibrium outcome.
A version of the model in which agents hold natural expectations seems to
captures the dynamics of U.S. home equity extraction during the recent boom
and bust relatively well. Finally, we highlight that financial experts natural-
ness is a crucial component for observing a large accumulation of debt at low
interest rates.
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1.8 Appendix: Confidence Band Impulse Response
House Price
The top panel of Figure 1.9 plots together the level impulse response of the
intuitive model (blue solid line) and the AIC model (green dotted line) and
their 95 percent confidence band (shaded area); the central panel plots to-
gether the level impulse response of the intuitive model (blue solid line) and
the BIC model (red dashed line) and their 95 percent confidence band; and
the bottom panel plots together the level impulse response of the intuitive
model (blue solid line) and the finite memory model (purple circled line) and
their 95 percent confidence band. As expected, the uncertainty around the
impulse responses is large and the confidence bands largely overlap.
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Figure 1.9: Impulse Response Functions with confidence bands

















Note: This figure reports the cumulative impulse response function (CIRF) of house price growth rate to
a positive unitary shock. Shaded areas represent the 95 per cent confidence intervals. Top panel: intuitive
model (blue solid line) and AIC model (green dotted line). Central panel: intuitive model (blue solid
line) and BIC model (red dashed line). Bottom panel: intuitive model (blue solid line) and finite memory
model (purple circled line).
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1.9 Appendix: Long-Run Price for Annual Data
Table 1.7: LRP and Confidence Band
Natural BIC AIC Short Memory
p 1 6 7 2
Long-Run Persistence (LRP) 2.76 1.72 1.52 2.29
Confidence Bands (95%) [2.17;4.49] [0.85;3.05] [0.67; 2.91] [0.25; 5.17]
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A recent stream of literature has investigated the role of foresight in fiscal
policy, which implies that the implementation of fiscal policy measures is
lagged with respect to their announcement (see, e.g., Leeper, Walker, and
Yang, 2013). This literature is concerned with the macroeconomic effects
implied by the presence of fiscal policy news. For example, Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2012), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Born, Peter, and Pfeifer
(2013) find that news shocks explain a major portion of government spending
fluctuations. Moreover, these studies find that news on government spend-
ing propagates significantly through the real economy: if one abstracts from
other sources of aggregate fluctuations and considers government spending
shocks in isolation, the expected components of government policies (i.e.,
news shocks) account for between 40% and 100% of the variance of GDP, and
the remaining variance is attributable to unexpected government spending
shocks.
News shocks are introduced in this literature by assuming that agents
have perfect foresight about the size and the timing of future policy. How-
ever, recent influential contributions in macroeconomics have highlighted the
role of imperfect information in business cycles. In particular, such findings
are found in Lorenzoni (2009), which shows that imperfect information about
aggregate productivity is a key source of cyclical fluctuation.
Given the considerable uncertainty surrounding the implementation of
fiscal policy, it seems natural to extend the setup to imperfect information
about news to the case of government spending. In this paper, we thus focus
on the macroeconomic effects of noisy fiscal policy announcements. By noisy
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announcements, we mean the following: A policymaker announces a fiscal
policy measure at a particular point in time that is supposed to come into
effect at a future date, while private agents in the economy believe that the
announcement may not be fully implemented. Partial implementation may
be due to amendments that occur during the legislative process or to incom-
plete information about future states of the economy. As a consequence, the
information structure we examine is different from previous papers in which
future fiscal policy is fully predictable.
Thus, the main contribution of this paper is twofold: i) we quantify the
size of noisy news using data from both forecasts and realizations of govern-
ment spending; ii) we assess the effect of noise and its propagation through
the economy using a medium-scale DSGE model with real frictions.
The main result of this paper is that a “noisy” announcement leads to an
under-reaction of macroeconomic variables to the announcement itself. The
values of the fiscal multipliers drastically fall compared to the full informa-
tion case. We make use of the official government spending forecasts from
the annual budgets of three countries (Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States) for which we were able to obtain enough information. We
find that the amount of noise observed for these three countries is rather sig-
nificant: the share of noise in these official government spending forecasts
ranges from 28% in the US to 84% in the UK. When embedding these esti-
mates into a full-fledged DSGE model, we find that in a “noisy” scenario,
before news events are realized, the value of government spending multipli-
ers, compared to the full information case, falls proportionally to the level of
noise. Additionally, the effect of noise does not vanish with the occurrence of
the fiscal shock. For example, in the UK, for which the relevance of noise is
most compelling, we obtain a loss in the output multiplier of approximately
10% one year after the materialization of the news compared to the perfect
information case. Such an effect is more pronounced for investment, even
in economies in which the role of noise is limited; for example, for the US,
which is the country with the lowest share of noise among those considered,
we find that the loss in the investment multiplier one year after the realiza-
tion of a news event remains at approximately 12%, a non-negligible figure.
Our work can thus be seen as an attempt to connect several bodies of liter-
ature. First, our paper is an extension of the literature on fiscal foresight. No-
tably, papers such as Ramey (2011) and Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2013) show
the relevance of fiscal foresight and the perils econometricians face from ig-
noring it.1 Such findings have been recently reinforced by Born, Peter, and
1An earlier attempt to introduce anticipated fiscal policy in an SVAR framework can be
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Pfeifer (2013), which shows that all of the output variance generated by fiscal
policies arises from news about government spending. We show that when
imperfect information is included, the effects of fiscal foresight are drastically
reduced.2
Other studies (Ellahie and Ricco, 2014; Ricco, 2014) introduce informa-
tional frictions in SVAR models, although no microfoundations for such fric-
tions are provided. In particular, Ricco (2014) introduces a shock to agents’
expectations, a so-called “misexpectation shock”, into a rather standard fiscal
VAR model. Such a shock is aimed at capturing “the differences between the
agents’ expectations about the current state of the economy and the ex-post
revealed value of macroeconomic variables” (Ricco 2014, p.4). This shock
is due to information frictions. The author finds that macroeconomic vari-
ables react to such shocks, albeit more moderately than to fundamental fiscal
shocks. In our paper, we recover similar findings and provide a structural
interpretation of agents’ misexpectations.
Our approach is also partly related to a set of papers on fiscal policy un-
certainty. One of these papers recently revived interest in fiscal uncertainty,
Bloom, Baker, and Davis (2013), which empirically demonstrates the detri-
mental effects of fiscal uncertainty on macroeconomic variables. Fernández-
Villaverde et al. (2011) instead develops a model in which the volatility of
fiscal policy is assumed to be changing over time. Such a feature of fiscal
policy leads to an increase in uncertainty and implies detrimental effects on
both output and consumption. When monetary policy is stuck at the zero
lower bound, such effects are reinforced. These findings are also shown in
a New Keynesian model by Johannsen (2014). There are, however, three
main differences between this strand of literature and our approach. First,
from a methodological point of view, we provide a structural interpreta-
tion of fiscal uncertainty (i.e., for the lack of full information), whereas in
the above-mentioned papers, uncertainty is modeled as an exogenous time
variation in the volatility of model disturbances. Second, we focus on gov-
ernment spending rather than on taxes because introducing (distortionary)
taxes would make our arguments slightly more opaque and because of the
found in Tenhofen and Wolff (2007).
2A slightly different approach is pursued in Hollmayr and Matthes (2015), wherein un-
certainty stems from the fact that agents learn whether shocks are temporary or permanent
over time. This, of course, leads to an increase in the volatility of the macro variables over the
short run compared with the case in which agents perfectly know the nature of the shock that
is affecting the economy. A similar result can be found in our paper when the economy ex-
periences a permanent fiscal shock. For a model of fiscal consolidation in which agents need
to learn whether restrictive fiscal shocks are temporary or permanent over time, see Lemoine
and Lindé (2015).
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lower comparability of tax schedules across countries.3 Third, the detrimen-
tal effects of uncertainty obtained in the above-mentioned papers are mainly
related to precautionary savings motives that arise from the time-varying na-
ture of the shocks’ volatility. In the current paper, we instead focus on the
first-order effects of uncertainty.
The idea that noise pollutes the impact of news shocks is not new in
macroeconomics. Indeed, a recent stream of literature has highlighted the
problems with the identification of these two shocks, although the focus of
this literature is on TFP shocks (Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni, 2013;
Barsky and Sims, 2012 and Forni et al., 2014). With respect to this literature,
our contribution is related not only to the introduction of noise in govern-
ment spending but also to the identification procedure, which relies on the
comparison of forecasts and realizations of the government spending pro-
cess.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce the quan-
titative model and highlight its key items. In Section 2.3, we introduce our
empirical methodology, while in Section 2.4, we estimate the amount of news
and noise in the data. In Section 2.5, the results of the quantitative exercise
are shown and discussed. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
To investigate the quantitative properties of noisy fiscal policy we rely on a
model with real frictions, along the lines of Mertens and Ravn (2011) and
Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012). The main features of the model
are described in the following sections.
Household and firm













where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, σ > 0 is a parameter governing the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution ( 1
σ
), ω > 0 is a scale parameter, and
κ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
3In an extension of our model (available upon request) with distortionary taxes on capital,
we show that an announced increase in taxes on capital negatively affects both output and
consumption. However, contrary to Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011), the lack of information
on news shocks in our model mitigates this negative effect.
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The variable zt is an exogenous, deterministic process representing a la-
bor augmenting technology that evolves according to
zt = γzzt−1.
The variable nt represents hours worked, while mt is a composite good made





t − bcνt−1v1−νt−1 ,
where ct and vt are non-durable and durable goods, respectively, and ν ∈
[0, 1] is a share parameter.
In each period the household budget constraint writes
ct + xt + dt = wtnt + rtutkt + Tt,
where xt and dt are new purchases of capital and of durable goods, respec-
tively.4 Real wages are denoted wt, returns on capital rt and capital utiliza-
tion ut. Taxes Tt are levied in a lump-sum fashion. The respective laws of
motion of capital and of durable goods are given by
























′ are greater than or equal to zero.5




yt − wtnt − rtutkt
s.t. yt = a (utkt)
θ (ztnt)
1−θ .
Given that the focus of this paper is on government spending shocks, we
keep – without loss of generality – TFP, denoted a, fixed.
4In our model, durable goods do not play a specific role. We introduce them to keep our
model as in line as possible with Mertens and Ravn (2011) and Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohé, and
Uribe (2012).


























The government budget is assumed to be balanced (i.e., Tt = gt), with a
government spending process that is exogenous and driven by news.6 The
process can be then written (in log-deviations from the steady state) as
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt−q εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε), (2.1)
where |ρ| ≤ 1, and εt is a white noise shock to government spending with
mean zero and variance equal to σ2ε . The exogenous fiscal policy shock is a
news shock that appears with a lag equal to q periods.
Notice that government spending is modeled as a rather persistent AR(1)
process. This modeling choice replicates the findings of several estimated
DSGE models, where the autoregressive parameter for government spend-
ing found is very close to unity (e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007), Mertens
and Ravn (2011), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2012)), and is reinforced by the findings discussed in Section 2.3.
For sake of simplicity, we focus here on the case with a single news shock
to government spending. More general representations (including multiple
news shocks) are discussed in Leeper et al. (2013) and Beaudry and Portier
(2014).7
Let us assume for simplicity that q = 1. Then, the timing of the shock is
such that the new policy is known one period in advance. Such timing is used
to illustrate the presence of noisy news. We will relax this assumption later by
considering longer lags in the announced government spending policy and a
more complex information structure. The new government policy expected
in period t+ 1 is then given by
Êtĝt+1 = ρĝt + Êtεt.
If the change in government spending is perfectly anticipated by private
agents, this equation reduces to
Êtĝt+1 = ρĝt + εt ≡ ĝt+1.
Thus, the expected change in government policy, represented by a news
shock, is perfectly forecasted by private agents, i.e., they know the new gov-
ernment policy in advance. Here, we depart from this setup by assuming that
6As Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup, one could also introduce government debt,
with the results being unaffected.
7See also, the discussion about identification with multiple news events in the next sec-
tion.
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private agents observe a noisy signal of εt (i.e., noisy news about government
spending) from
st = εt + νt, (2.2)
where νt represents a noise shock. This variable is assumed to be a zero
mean white noise with variance σ2ν , and it is uncorrelated with εt for any
time index. If the endogenous variables of the model react to noise, then the
economy displays sunspot-like fluctuations, as it is affected by shocks that
are unrelated to fundamentals. This noise shock is of central interest in the
following sections. It represents how the private sector anticipates the way
that government policy is conducted.
Such noise is meant to capture the complex political process that leads
to policy changes, as well as political economy considerations. For example,
such a setting could capture a situation wherein a policymaker announces
measures that can be partially eliminated during the legislative process (for
example, because of a different majority in parliament).
If the volatility of νt is negligible with respect to εt, private agents would
react immediately to news in the government policy. In this case, the pri-
vate sector perfectly foresees how an announced government spending pol-
icy will be conducted. If the signal is noisy, this is no longer the case. Indeed,
expectations of the new policy are corrupted because private agents do not
react perfectly to the announcement about government spending in such an
environment.
In this imperfect information case, the conditional expectations of private
agents are given by
Êtεt = αst ≡ α (εt + νt) ,








When information is perfectly transmitted to private agents in the economy
(α = 1 and σν = 0), they fully incorporate the announced government policy
in the next period, so they can immediately adjust their consumption and
labor supply decisions to the new economic conditions. Conversely, when
the announced policy is completely noisy (σε/σν → 0 and α → 0), they will
not react, as their expectations are insensitive to the new policy.
Before calibrating and solving the model, we describe the methodology
used to extract both news and noise from the data, we then discuss the results
of our estimation.
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2.3 Identifying news and noise from government
spending forecasts
In this section, we will discuss our empirical methodology for recovering the
relative contributions of news and noise using both realizations and expec-
tations of government spending. Instead of using a full information estima-
tion technique that requires us to solve and estimate a DSGE model with
noisy news shocks and other disturbances, we propose a simple limited in-
formation approach that only exploits data for actual realizations and fore-
casts of government spending. In addition to its simplicity, an advantage of
this procedure is that the estimation does not depend on the specification of
the whole DSGE model. As most of the data we consider are available at an
annual frequency, we will also propose a method to recover the parameters
at a quarterly frequency.
Methodology
The methodology we rely on for recovering α is an application of the method
of moments, with targeted moments being derived by comparing the agents’
forecasts and actual government spending.
To start, assume that government spending obeys process (2.1) with q ≥ 1.
Also suppose that agents observe ĝt and a signal as in (2.2) from which they
infer the value of εt. Regardless of the value of q, the econometrician has
enough information to estimate ρ and σ2ε from the observation of ĝt.
Additionally, the agents’ forecasts will be








St = {st, st−1,...} .
We can then make use of these forecasts to estimate the variance of noise by
computing the one-period-ahead forecast net of the autoregressive compo-
nent
Êtĝt+1 − ρĝt = α (εt−q+1 + νt−q+1) (2.3)


























From the inspection of (2.4), notice that σ2ε > V1. Note that this moment does
not depend on the lag q of the announcement: this property allows us to
recover α.8 Once we have α and εt, we can directly recover the noise νt from
(2.3).
An equivalent way to estimate α relies on performing a linear projection




where the residual of this OLS regression of αst over εt is equal to ανt, so the
time series of νt is also easily recovered. An interesting observation comes
from the fact that the R2 of the regression is equal to α. This means that
when the signal is not very noisy (i.e., σν → 0), a good inference can be made
concerning the fundamentals of the economy. However, when the signal is
extremely noisy (i.e., σν → ∞), no inference can be made.
Discussion
Two remarks on the suggested methodology are in order. First, note that the
above identification strategy crucially relies on the fact that the information
set of the agents and that of the econometrician do not coincide. On the one
hand, the econometrician does not directly observe the signal and therefore
has to recover it indirectly from agents’ expectations. On the other hand, the
econometrician observes the future realizations from the actual government
spending process, which are unknown data when the agents produce their
forecasts. Hence, by comparing the outcome with the agents’ forecasts, the
econometrician is able to recover α.
Second, note that the estimation procedure for α can be polluted by model
misspecification. We discuss three types of misspecification in the following
paragraphs.
8We acknowledge, however, that this is not a general result. This property is obtained
here because we consider a single news shock. With multiple news shocks and signals, the
estimated α is polluted by the signals. See the discussion below.
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Expected and unexpected fiscal shocks A first type of misspecification may
arise if the true government spending process includes an expected and an
unexpected component
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + ǫt−q + ηt,
with ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η). We will prove that ignoring the unexpected component
of government spending leads to estimating an upper (lower) bound for the
role of noise (news).
Suppose that the econometrician mistakenly ignores ηt and instead tries
to estimate the model as in (2.1): she will then mistakenly treat the two shocks
ηt + εt−q as a single shock (denoted wt). The variance of estimated news will




ε . However the variance of the forecast, net of the autore-
gressive component, Êtĝt+1 − ρĝt = αst−q+1 is equal to ασ2ε . Dividing this













where it can be seen that the lower the relative share of the expected compo-
nent in government expenditure, the smaller the estimated α and the more
relevant the misspecification bias.
Such misspecification, however, should not be troublesome in practice
because Born, Peter, and Pfeifer (2013) show that the quantitative relevance
of unexpected shocks to government spending is extremely limited, while
almost all of its variance is due to expected shocks (and thus, α̃ is very close
to the true noise-to-signal ratio).
Multiple noisy news A different misspecification issue arises in if there are
multiple noisy news. For clarity, we restrict our attention here to the case of
two noisy news, although the argument can be easily made more general.
Consider the government spending process
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + ε1,t−1 + ε2,t−2,





tively. They are also uncorrelated. Private agents receive a noisy signal (s1,t,
s2,t) for each news shock. The challenge here is to identify five parameters:
ρ, σε,1, σε,2, α1 and α2 (or equivalently, σν,1 and σν,2). However, identifying
all the parameters is not possible: our limited information approach has the
advantage of being able to identify noisy news without specifying a whole
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model, but with the disadvantage that it uses too little information to esti-
mate a richer specification of government spending. Identification can be
achieved only if we impose some restrictions on the noise parameters.9
Also of interest is the case when the true model is composed of two noisy
news shocks but the econometrician attempts to estimate the process as in
(2.1). Direct computations yield







is the fraction of the variance of government spending explained by the news
shock ε1,t−1. It appears that our procedure correctly identifies the true noisy
news if ω → 1 (i.e., the news shock ε1,t−1 explains most of the variance of
government spending) and/or α1 ≃ α2. Conversely, if the noisy structures
are significantly different (α1 6= α2) and the news shock ε2,t−2 is the main
driver (ω → 0), the procedure will correctly identify the value of α2 but will
fail to identify the true number of lags. However, note that the estimation
results in Born, Peter, and Pfeifer (2013) indicate that among the news shocks,
only the news shock with the longest delay matters, meaning that we can
reasonably restrict our analysis to a single news shock.
Misspecification of the Autoregressive Process Thus far, we assumed that
the AR(1) process for government spending is the true process. One may
wonder how our estimate of α is affected by a misspecification of the autore-
gressive process. Let us then assume that the true data generating process
(DGP) is an AR(2) process
ĝt = ρ1ĝt−1 + ρ2ĝt−2 + εt−1,
where ρ1 + ρ2 < 1, ρ2 − ρ1 < 1 and |ρ2| < 1 to satisfy stationarity condi-
tions. Suppose that we wrongly assume that government spending follows
an AR(1) process. Some tedious calculations10 yield the estimated value of α
in the misspecified AR(1) model under the true DGP
α̃ = µ1 (µ0 + α) ,
9For example, if we assume the same signal structure for both news processes (σ2ε,1 =
σ2ε,2 = σ
2
ε and σν,1 = σν,2 = σν,), then it is possible to retrieve the model parameters using
























The estimated value α̃ is a biased estimate of the true α unless ρ2 6= 0. When
ρ2 → 0, µ0 → 0 and µ1 → 1, the bias tends to zero. There is no trivial charac-
terization of this bias with respect to ρ1 and ρ2, but we can consider a simple
illustrative example11 that highlights the consequence of misspecification for
the estimation of α. We set ρ1 = 0, and then, ρ2 can vary between −1 and 1.
In this case, the estimation of α from the misspecified AR(1) model is given
by
α̃ = ρ22 + (1− ρ22)α.
When ρ2 → ±1, the estimated value tends to one, and thus, we will in-
correctly conclude that there is no noise in government spending policy. For
any value of ρ2 6= 0, the estimation of the misspecified AR(1) model can yield
α̃ > α; thus, we wrongly underestimate the size of the noise.
To address this misspecification issue, in what follows, we model gov-
ernment spending as an AR(1) process. As discussed, such a choice is not
only in line with the literature but also with the evidence at our disposal.
Indeed, if one takes the quarterly detrended log-series of real per capita gov-
ernment spending in the US (from 1952Q1 to 2014Q1), the AR(1) will be,
among the ARMA(p,q) processes, selected using the Bayesian Information
and Hannan-Quinn criteria.12 The above evidence is also supported by the
shape of the partial autocorrelation function, where the strong autocorrela-
tion that emerges at a one-quarter lag suddenly disappears from two lags on,
whereas the same function computed on ∆gt shows that this latter process
has no significant autocorrelation at any lag (see Figure 2.9 in 2.8).
Recovering quarterly series
Most of the series we address are available at a yearly frequency, while most
of the literature examines quarterly frequency data. Thus, a further step is
11See 2.7 for another illustration of misspecification.
12If one were to use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the chosen process would be
the ARMA(5,2). The AIC function, however, is very flat for processes with autoregressive
parameters between 1 and 5. Additionally, the AIC results should be treated with caution
given the well-known fact that this criterion is not consistent (see Lütkepohl 2005).
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needed to convert our annual data into quarterly data. To do so, once the
yearly parameters have been recovered, we make use of an indirect inference
algorithm (Smith, 1993) to obtain comparable moments at a quarterly fre-
quency.13 The algorithm essentially generates simulated quarterly series for
actual (with news) and expected (with news and noise) government spend-
ing whose moments, aggregated at a yearly frequency, yield the the same
moments observed in the data. The outcome of the algorithm is a so-called
“binding function” that links the α computed at a yearly frequency with pa-
rameters computed at a quarterly frequency. The function, reported in Figure
2.10 in 2.8, is increasing in both the autoregressive parameter and in the share
of news in the signal. Note, however, that the higher the value of ρ, the flatter
the function becomes in the value of α at an annual frequency. This implies
that in such a case, two close annual estimates of α may lead to significantly
different quarterly estimates of α.
In what follows, we apply the methodology described above to Canada,
the United Kingdom and the United States.
2.4 Estimation results
In this section, we identify the relative importance of noise and news in the
data, making use of the official government spending forecasts reported in
the annual budgets of Canada, United Kingdom and United States as the
primary data sources. For the US case, we also refer to another source of
government spending forecasts, the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF),
as a robustness check14. The output of our moments comparison exercise for
these three countries is summarized in Table 2.1.
Canada
For Canada, we collect data from the annual federal budgets from 1968 to
2012. In Canada, the budget - which defines the budget plan for the next fiscal
year (FY) - is usually presented to parliament between January and June. The
FY in Canada starts on April 1st and ends on March, 31st of the next calendar
year. The variable that we track was called “Budgetary Expenditures” until
1982. Since 1987, it has been called “Program Expenditures” (data from 1983
to 1986 are missing and have thus been interpolated via cubic splines). This
13Note that if we were to resort to usual temporal disaggregation techniques, we would
obtain smooth time series in which the role of noise is significantly reduced.
14See 2.12 for the data sources.
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Country Annual Quarterly
ρ α ρ α
Canada (Budget) 0.86 0.70 0.95 0.23
(0.016) (0.039) (0.011) (0.010)
UK (Budget) 0.84 0.66 0.94 0.16
(0.017) (0.024) (0.012) (0.007)
US (Budget) 0.85 0.89 0.94 0.72
(0.018) (.045) (0.012) (0.032)
US (SPF) 0.97 0.84 0.99 0.52
(0.009) ( 0.036) (0.007) (0.055)
Table 2.1: Estimated values of α and ρ at annual and quarterly frequencies.
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 replications of the residuals are reported in parenthe-
ses.
broad item includes all government outlays net of servicing or repayment of
debt.15 We complement such series with their one-year-ahead forecasts, as
reported by the government in its budget.
We divide both series by population and by the GDP implicit price de-
flator and then detrend them with a linear trend. The population series was
first disaggregated at a quarterly frequency using standard disaggregation
techniques16 and then aggregated at a FY frequency. The resulting series of
actual expenditures along with the one-year-ahead forecasts are reported in
Figure 2.11 in 2.8.
The estimated process is fairly persistent (ρ = 0.86), while the share of
news in the signal is approximately 70%. When translated into quarterly fre-
quency, we obtain ρ = 0.95 and α = .23. The dynamics of news and noise are
reported in Figure 2.1. A reduction in news and noise volatility is observed
during the 90s in conjunction with the start of the so-called “Great Moder-
ation”, while no significant increase in volatility is recorded at the time of
the global financial crisis. Such a result is consistent with the narrative that
Canada was among the few developed countries not significantly impacted
by the global financial crisis. Thus, no specific fiscal actions (i.e., neither stim-
ulus nor austerity measures) were implemented by policymakers due to the
15It would have been desirable to analyze more narrow series for government consump-
tion and investment, but the lack of available data led us to use the above-described series.

















Figure 2.1: Dynamics of news and noise in Canada
Note: This figure plots the estimated dynamics of news and noise in the Canadian data.
United Kingdom
To identify the contribution of news and noise in government spending for
the UK, we use the historical official forecasts database made available by the
Office for Budget Responsibility.17 This database collects the forecasts made
for each year’s budget as presented by the government, which usually occurs
in March for the following FY.18 We focus on forecasts for total managed ex-
penditures (TME), which is a broad measure of total government spending
in the UK that includes public sector current expenditures, public sector net
investment and depreciation, transfers and debt servicing. The forecasts are
available for FY 1989-90 to FY 2012-13.
We also collect data on actual TME. This series is available at annual fre-
quency from FY 1946-47 to FY 2012-13.
17See http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/data.
18In the UK, the FY starts in April and ends in March of the next calendar year.
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We first divide this series by a price index to obtain the variables ex-
pressed in real terms.19 Then, we detrend them by a linear trend and compute
the autoregressive parameter and the variance. The estimated autoregressive
parameter is 0.84, a value that is very similar (0.94), when converted to quar-
terly frequency, to the value obtained for Canada. The value of α at an annual
frequency is estimated to be 0.66, thus implying a higher share of noise in the
signal than in the Canadian data. This implies an even smaller value for α at
a quarterly frequency (0.16). It should be stressed, however, that such a value
may also be affected by the short series available (23 years). This limitation
notwithstanding, a reduction in news and noise can be observed from 2000
to 2009 (see Figure 2.2), while an increase in volatility can be observed more
recently, possibly related to the adoption of tighter fiscal policy by the UK
government.













Figure 2.2: Dynamics of news and noise in the United Kingdom
Note: This figure plots the estimated dynamics of news and noise in the UK data.
19We make use of the GDP deflator from 1955 to 2012, while from 1946 to 1954, we make
use of the long-term indicator of consumer goods and services prices (source: ONS).
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United States
To estimate news and noise in US government spending, we use two distinct
datasets. Our main reference will be the annual federal budgets, but we also
use SPF data, which allows to perform some robustness checks.
Budget data
We first gather data on actual and forecasted “Total Budget Outlays” ex-
tracted from the US federal budgets from 1968 to 2013. The series displays
a degree of persistence broadly in line with that observed for Canada and
the UK (ρ = 0.85 at an annual frequency, ρ = .94 at a quarterly frequency).
However, the share of news in the signal the agents receive is higher than
in the previous cases, approximately 0.89 at an annual frequency, which im-
plies α = 0.72 at a quarterly frequency. As can be observed in Figure 2.3,
the volatility of news and noise sharply has increased in recent years, espe-
cially in 2009 (possibly due to the enactment of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act), 2010 and 2012.
Survey of Professional Forecasters
We complement the above findings using an alternative source of quarterly
government spending data, the SPF. The item we focus on is the median fore-
cast of real federal government consumption expenditures and gross invest-
ment (the variable RFEDGOV). The information structure of the SPF is as
follows. Forecasters are provided with information about the realization in
the preceding quarter; hence, they know gt−1. They receive a questionnaire
at the end of the first month of quarter t, which they submit by the middle
of the second month of period t. It is fair to assume that they have noisy
information about gt, whose preliminary estimate will only be available in
the future, that is, at the end of t. Therefore, we consider forecasts of gt that
are made in period t to be noisy. In this way, we access forecasts up to five
periods ahead.
As the government spending series in the SPF has been subject to several
revisions, we rebase the series on the NIPA federal government current re-
ceipts and expenditures series divided by the CPI. Both the actual series and
the forecasts are then detrended by a linear trend. Table 2.1 reports the results
of the estimation procedure. The autoregressive parameter is very persistent
and close to 1 (it is .987). The variances of the news and noise shocks are very
close, thus implying that α = 0.52. Compared to the estimates obtained from
budget data, the degree of persistence is higher, while the share of news in
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Figure 2.3: Dynamics of news and noise in the US
Note: This figure plots the estimated dynamics of news and noise in US budget data and annualized SPF
data.
the signal is lower. This suggests that agents in the economy perceive fiscal
policy as being more noisy than it really is. Overall, the SPF data confirm
the robustness of our findings. In Figure 2.3, we plot the annualized series
of news and noise shocks as identified using the budget data and the SPF
data. The news series is very similar across these two datasets. For the noise
series, notice that they qualitatively capture the same dynamics, especially
during the 80s. Such a result seems to confirm the robustness of the esti-
mation exercise, taking into account that the datasets are related to different
time series, computed at different frequencies and over time spans that only
partially overlap.
On the rational expectations hypothesis As an aside, it is worth noting
that implicit in our methodology is an assumption of rational expectations.
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In other words, we assume that forecasts are unbiased and efficient.20 To
support this assumption, we checked our dataset to determine whether the
forecast errors (Et−1gt − gt) indeed have a zero mean and whether their dis-
tribution is not skewed or normal. If forecast errors have zero mean, then
the forecasts are, on average, unbiased. The results of these tests are reported
in Table 2.3 in 2.10. The hypothesis of a zero mean for the forecast errors is
confirmed across all countries at a 95 percent confidence interval. The skew-
ness of distribution of the forecast errors is examined using the D’Agostino
skewness test, whose null hypothesis implies that the data are not skewed.
The results of the test confirm that the UK and US data do not display a
significant degree of skewness, whereas the null hypothesis for Canada is
rejected.21 The normality test performed via the Jarque-Bera test, indicates
that the forecast errors computed on UK and US budget data are normally
distributed, while the errors for Canadian budget data and US SPF data are
not. Overall, these findings suggest that the distribution of forecast errors is
centered at zero and not skewed. Therefore, at a minimum, they imply that
the rational expectations hypothesis cannot be discarded.
Robustness checks using SPF data
The quarterly frequency of the SPF data allows us to perform further robust-
ness checks on the possible endogeneity of noise. Indeed, one may claim that
what we have labeled “noise” so far could be mere model misspecification
that arises from ignoring the endogenous response of fiscal policy to macro
variables. Therefore, we assume that the government spending rule is of the
kind
gt = ρgt−1 + γXt + εt−q, (2.5)
20We are aware of potential issues related to bias in both forecasts and data revisions, but
we decided to rely on the assumption of rational expectations for two reasons. First, we
deem the costs of departing from this hypothesis (in terms of both the number of degrees
of freedom for the underlying assumptions and the complexity of the empirical approach)
to outweigh the benefits. Second, as discussed next in the text, our dataset seems to satisfy,
overall, the rational expectations hypothesis, which is in line with the findings of Pesaran and
Weale (2006).
21More precisely, the forecast errors for Canada display negative skewness, thus indicating
that realizations of government spending tend to outperform forecasts – although, on average,
the forecast error is zero. However, a close inspection of the Canadian time series reveals that
the skewness is due to two data points (related to the years 1974 and 1975). If one removes
these two points from the series, the null hypothesis for skewness is confirmed.
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where Xt is a measure of economic activity such as real per capita GDP (in
log-deviation from a linear trend) or the level of detrended TFP.22. Alter-
natively, Xt may be a dummy for NBER recession dates or for the political
party in power during period t. The former aims to control for structural
differences in the path of government spending during recessions, while the
latter aims to control for different political spending styles. To estimate news
and noise in such a model, we need to observe ÊtXt+1. To maintain tractabil-
ity, we use the realization of Xt+1 (thus assuming perfect foresight of this
variable).
We then estimate both OLS regressions and IV regressions (using the one-
period lag of Xt as the instrumental variable) for equation (2.5) and report
the results in Table 2.2. In all these cases, we obtain a level of noise that is
similar to the process without an endogenous component. These findings
thus confirm that the source of noise in the data is outside the model.
Endogenous GDP TFP NBER Democrat
component recessions Republican
OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS
ρ 0.9862 0.9858 0.9856 0.9856 0.9859 0.9860
( 0.0095) 0.0095) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0095) ( 0.0095)
γ 0.1084 -0.0569 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0039 0.0008
(0.0748) (0.0831) ( 0.000) (0.0002) (0.0035) ( 0.0056)
α 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.53
(0.0463) (0.0563) (0.0582) (0.0567) (0.0505) (0.0543)
Table 2.2: Estimates of α with endogenous components in the spending rule.
Note: In the IV regressions, we use lagged realizations of Xt as instruments. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Standard errors for the α parameter are obtained through a bootstrapping procedure
based on 1000 replications of the residuals.
To check the goodness of fit of our approach, we also simulated data (see
Table 2.4 in 2.10). More precisely, we modified our DSGE model by introduc-
ing an endogenous government spending rule as in (2.5) with the log of de-
trended GDP on the right-hand side. The parameters were calibrated on the
IV regression with GDP.23 We then generated simulated data for 1000 periods
from the model assuming that news and noise shocks were the only sources
22The source for this GDP data is the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, while for TFP,
the source is the Federal Reserve of San Francisco (see http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/indicators-data/total-factor-productivity-tfp/)
23Therefore, the parameters were set as follows: ρ = 0.9858, γ = −0.0569 and α = 0.54.
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of economic fluctuation and estimated the regressions using these simulated
data to determine whether the true parameters could be recovered. The re-
sults reported in Table 2.4 show that the values of the parameters estimated
via an IV approach are close to the values of the true parameters. Interest-
ingly, given that the feedback coefficient is found to be non-significant in the
IV regression, a simple AR(1) estimation would be able to generate values for
ρ and α that are very close to the true values.
2.5 Quantitative results from the DSGE model
The model is log-linearized around the non-stochastic steady state and solved
using standard methods. The values of the parameters, which are reported in
2.9, are taken from Mertens and Ravn (2011) and Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohé,
and Uribe (2012), with the notable exception of the parameters related to
government spending and information flows. Although the parameters in
the original Mertens and Ravn (2011) paper were estimated using US data,
we apply the same calibration to the UK and Canada to compare their out-
put with that of the US model. Furthermore, to make the results compara-
ble across countries, and because the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests do not reject the unit root hypothesis, we conduct simulations for
these countries setting the autoregressive parameter of government spending
equal to 1. Note, however, than none of our qualitative results is due to the
fact that we assume that ρ = 1 in the government spending process. The
quantitative results do not change significantly as long as the government
spending process displays enough persistence.24 Lastly, for comparability
we set q = 4 for all countries, a fairly conservative value in line with the lit-
erature on fiscal news (Born et al. 2013,Leeper et al. 2013, Mertens and Ravn
2011 and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2012).
Inspecting the mechanism
Before comparing the outcomes of the model under the estimated values of
α, Figure 2.4 plots the IRFs for output, non-durables, durable goods and in-
vestment reactions to a news and a noise shock in a fictitious case wherein
the amount of noise is equivalent to the amount of news (i.e., α = .5). Note
that output jumps up in period 4 only if the announced increase in govern-
ment spending actually takes place; if the announcement turns out to be pure
24For a discussion of the macroeconomic role of government spending persistence, see
Dupaigne and Fève (2015).
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noise it means that no actual spending occurs. As expected, the shapes of the
IRFs are the same for noise and news until the shock actually occurs. This
similarity is due to the fact that agents in this economy are not able to iden-
tify the source of the variation in the signal. An important corollary is that
choice variables also react to a noise shock until the news event is realized.
Moreover, noise shocks affect real variables even after their non-fundamental
nature is revealed. In other words, when an announcement is at least par-
tially noisy (i.e., α > 0), an announced increase in government spending is
able to generate a positive response of output even if the positive signal is
due entirely to noise.

























Figure 2.4: IRFs for output, consumption, durable goods and investment to a
noise and a news shock
Note: This figure plots the IRFs for output, non-durables consumption, durable goods consumption and
investment (as percentages) to a 1 percent shock to government spending under a mild level of noise
(α = 0.5).
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The long-lasting effect of noise can be gauged by performing a variance
decomposition of news and noise shocks at different horizons for the above
variables. These results are plotted in Figure 2.5. Noise still explains ap-
proximately 20 percent of the investment variance after 10 periods while the
percentage is a bit lower for consumption of both non-durable and durable
goods. The variance of output is much less affected by noise after that noise
is revealed. This pattern is due to the fact that output is the sum of consump-
tion, durables, investment and government spending, and this latter variable
(which exhibits no variance before period 5) is not affected by noise.


































Figure 2.5: Conditional variance decomposition of news and noise shocks at
different horizons
Note: This figure plots the conditional variance decomposition of news and noise shocks at different
horizons for output, consumption of non-durables, consumption of durable goods and investment under
a mild level of noise (α = 0.5).
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Quantifying the effect of noisy news
We investigate the quantitative impact of noise by comparing the IRFs for a
news shock under different assumptions about the information flow. More
precisely, we compare the outcome of an economy under perfect information
about government spending (α = 1) to one under the parametrization im-
plied by the estimated noise to signal ratio in Table 2.1. For the value of α
in the US, we rely on budget data for consistency with the UK and Canada
datasets, which are also based on budget data. The results of this exercise are
reported in Figure 2.6.
Note that the main role played by noise is to mitigate the dynamics of the
variables. Additionally, due to real rigidities, even after the shock is realized,
agents’ reactions tend to lag behind the reaction observed under perfect in-
formation. Comparing the outcomes under partial information, the response
of the UK and Canada are similar, while as expected, the reaction of the US
is closer to the full information benchmark.
In Figure 2.6, the variable that reacts the most is investment. This result is
much in line with the view of news shocks as an inducer of “animal spirits”
(see Beaudry and Portier 2014) and is related to the fact that investment is
a forward-looking variable mainly because it cannot immediately adjust to
external shocks. However, the presence of noise dampens the adjustment of
investment. As for consumption and durable goods, investment under-reacts
until the uncertainty is resolved (in period 5), and then, a phase of gradual
catch-up to the perfect information case occurs.
We now address the issue of quantifying the impact of noise on some
measures of fiscal multipliers. First, note that over the long run, the economy
is not affected by imperfect information: the long-run multiplier for output,
defined as the relative variation in the steady states of output and govern-
ment spending after a persistent government spending shock, is equal to
1.35, irrespective of the severity of the information issue because when the
news shock is realized, agents will be able to infer it from the dynamics of
government spending and will thus gradually adjust their choices. Over the
short to medium run, however, the picture can substantially change due to
the frictions generated by imperfect information.
To quantify the impact of information frictions on the transmission of fis-
cal policy shocks, we compute two measures of the government spending
multipliers for output, consumption and investment.25 The first one is com-
25Multipliers for durable goods are reported in 2.8.
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Figure 2.6: IRFs for a news shock
Note: This figure plots the IRFs for output, non-durable consumption, durable goods consumption and
investment (as percentages) reactions to a 1 percent shock in government spending under the assumption







for t = 1, ..., T , where Xt is alternatively output, consumption or invest-
ment, while X and G denote the steady state values, and variables with a hat
are log-deviations from the steady state.
The second measure is the net present value of the multiplier (Mountford












Note that in the first case, the denominator is lagged forward as the news
shock occurs in period t + q. In the upper panels of Figure 2.7, the values of
GSMt and NPVt for output are reported for the three economies considered
along with the full information benchmark.
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Figure 2.7: Output multipliers and deviation from the full information mul-
tipliers
Note: This figure plots the multipliers for output and the deviation (as a percentage) under partial infor-








where X is alternatively the GSM and the NPV of the GSM, and i = CA,UK,US.
In both cases, the values of the multipliers under partial information are
consistently lower than in the case of perfect information. To gain a quanti-
tative insight into the loss for each economy due to information frictions, we
compute the distance in percentage terms of the multiplier for each economy
from the corresponding full information multiplier. The results are reported
in the lower panels of the figure and expressed in percentage terms. Note
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that if one considers the GSM , the losses for the UK and Canada are well
above 80% until the news is realized. In fact, the loss from the full informa-
tion multiplier is exactly equal to 1 − α and is not dependent on the value
of the parameters or on the frictions in the model.26 After the realization of
the news shock, the loss falls to approximately 15 percent or less, while the
multiplier gradually converges to its long-run value. The loss for the US is
less severe on impact (28 percent), but still notable.
If we consider the multipliers for consumption and investment (Figure
2.8), we note that the negative effect on consumption is fairly small (up to
-0.15 over the long run). The effect on investment, however, is significant.
The potential of investment is dampened by noise: the investment multiplier
soon after the shock is realized (period 5) is approximately 0.4 under full
information. This value drops significantly to 0.2 or less in all three cases
when imperfect information is considered. In contrast to the multiplier on
output, such a multiplier loss is not rapidly recovered after the realization
of the shock. For example, in period 10, both consumption and investment
multipliers in noisy environments are still approximately 20 percent less than
the level one would have observed under full information.
2.6 Conclusion
The role of imperfect information in business cycles is one of the most promis-
ing research paths recently explored in macroeconomics. In this paper, we
highlighted the relationship between imperfect or “noisy” information and
the conduct of fiscal policy.
Using official forecasts of government spending as reported in the annual
budgets of Canada, the UK and the US, we demonstrated the implementation
of a limited information approach (a simple method of moments) to identify
news and noise. The amount of noise observed for these three countries is
significant: on average, the percentage of noise in official government spend-
ing forecasts ranges from 28% to 84%. Using these values in a richer DSGE
setting, we highlighted the detrimental effects on fiscal multipliers, particu-
larly on investment multipliers.
26We also performed the above exercises using alternative specifications of the model (re-
sults available upon request). More precisely, we removed durable goods and introduced
nominal frictions in the form of Calvo pricing to a model à la Smets and Wouters. All of the
above results hold, and for a reasonable calibration of the parameters related to price sticki-
ness and monetary policy reaction, we quantitatively obtain very similar values for multipli-
ers from period 5 on.
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Figure 2.8: Consumption and investment multipliers and deviation from full
information multipliers
Note: This figure plots the multipliers for consumption and investment and the deviation under partial







where X is alternatively the GSM and the NPV of the GSM and i = CA,UK,US.
Our approach can be fruitfully extended to other policy settings in which
announcements play crucial roles, such as monetary policy (forward guid-
ance) or banking regulations and structural reforms implemented with lags.
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2.7 Appendix: Further results on misspecification
Estimation of α̃
The true data generating process (DGP) is an AR(2) process
ĝt = ρ1ĝt−1 + ρ2ĝt−2 + εt−1
and the misspecified AR(1) model is written
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + ε̃t−1
Under the AR(2), we first estimate the parameter ρ in the AR(1) model. From





To obtain an estimate of α in the misspecified AR(1) model, we linearly project
Etĝt+1 − ρĝt on ĝt+1 − ρĝt. We deduce
α̃ =
Cov (Etĝt+1 − ρĝt, ĝt+1 − ρĝt)
V (ĝt+1 − ρĝt)
=
Cov ((ρ1 − ρ)ĝt + ρ2ĝt−1 + α(εt + νt), (ρ1 − ρ)ĝt + ρ2ĝt−1 + εt)
V ((ρ1 − ρ)ĝt + ρ2ĝt−1 + εt)
=
((ρ1 − ρ)2 + ρ22)V (ĝt) + 2(ρ1 − ρ)ρ2Cov(ĝt, ĝt−1) + ασ2ε













Cov(ĝt, ĝt−1) + ασ
2
ε
V ((ρ1 − ρ)ĝt + ρ2ĝt−1 + εt)
Using the autocovariances (at orders 0 and 1), we deduce
V (ĝt) =
(1− ρ2)σ2ε





(1 + ρ2)((1− ρ2)2 − ρ21)














































































































































A simple illustration of misspecification
Let us assume that the true data generating process (DGP) is an AR(1), but
we wrongly assume that government spending does not display serial cor-
relation. To obtain an estimate of α in the misspecified AR(1) model, we
linearly project Etĝt+1 on ĝt+1 and use the true stochastic process of govern-
ment spending. The estimated value for α in the misspecified model under
the true DGP is given by
α̃ = ρ+ α(1− ρ2)
Assume that ρ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., government spending can display serial correla-
tion. This implies that α̃ ≥ α, so we will underestimate the size of the noise.
For example, if ρ → 1, the estimated value tends to one. Thus, we will incor-
rectly conclude that there is no noise in government spending policy.
2.8 Appendix: Additional graphs
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Figure 2.9: Partial autocorrelation of government spending in the US
Note: In this figure, the autocorrelation functions for the quarterly log-series of real per capita government
spending in the US (linearly detrended from 1952Q1 to 2014Q1, left panel) and for its first difference (∆gt,
right panel) are plotted. Confidence intervals are at 95% level. Series: “Real Government Consumption
Expenditures and Gross Investment” (id: GCEC96), source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; “Total
Population: All Ages including Armed Forces Overseas”, source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census
Bureau.
2.9 Appendix: Calibrated values
Parameter Value Description
γz 1.005 Trend
θ .36 Capital share
Y 1 Steady state output
G
Y
0.201 Share of government spending
ν 1 Capital utilization at steady state
N .25 Labor at steady state
C
D
7.4034 Consumption to durables
σ 3.7621 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
b 0.8804 Habit formation
β 0.9742 Discount factor
κ 0.9759 Disutility of labor
ωi 8.488 Adjustment cost for investment
ωd 7.795 Adjustment cost for durables
ρg 1 Persistence of government spending shock
























Figure 2.10: The binding function
Note: This figure plots the binding function that yields the share of news at a yearly frequency (αa) as a
function of the share of news and the autoregressive parameter of the quarterly series (αb and ρ).
Note: The values of the parameters are taken from Mertens and Ravn (2011), except for the parameters
related to the government spending process (ρg and σg).
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Figure 2.11: Log of detrended per capita real government spending in
Canada
Note: This figure plots actual realizations and one-step-ahead forecasts of the log of detrended per capita
real government spending in Canada.
2.10 Appendix: Additional tables
81













Figure 2.12: Log of detrended per capita real government spending in the UK
Note: This figure plots realizations and one step ahead forecasts of the log of detrended per capita real
government spending in the United Kingdom.
2.11 Appendix: Durable goods multipliers and NPV
GSM for consumption and investment
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Figure 2.13: Log of detrended per capita real government spending in the US
Note: This figure plots realizations and one-step-ahead forecasts of the log of detrended per capita real
government spending in the United States.
2.12 Appendix: Data sources
Canada
The following are the series for Canada:
• Government Spending: “Budget Expenditures” (up to 1982) and “Pro-
gram Expenses” (from 1987). Source: Budget Speech and Budget Plan,
various years.
• Population: “Total population”. Source: World Bank (series id: SP.POP.TOTL)
• Price deflator: “GDP Implicit Price Deflator”. Source: OECD.
United Kingdom
The following are the series for the UK:
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Country t-test D’Agostino Jarque-Bera
(µ = 0) skewness test test
Canada -0.0073 Skew=-1.8754 χ22= 144.6786
[-0.0283; 0.0137] (0.0050) ( 0.0000)
UK 0.0014 Skew=0.1623 χ22=0.6364
[-0.0026; 0.0054] (0.804) (0.7274)
US (Budget) -0.0125 Skew = -0.2756 χ22=0.5967
[-0.0248; -0.0002] (0.5802) (0.7421)
US (SPF) -0.0016 Skew=-0.1480 χ22=36.6799
[ -0.0043; 0.0011] (0.6335) (0.0000)
Table 2.3: Zero mean, skewness and normality tests on forecast errors.
In the t-test column, the lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals are reported in
brackets. The D’Agostino skewness test and Jarque-Bera test p-values are reported in parentheses. The
null hypothesis for the D’Agostino skewness test is that data have no skewness. The null hypothesis for
the Jarque-Bera test is that data are normally distributed.
True parameters AR(1) IV
ρ 0.9858 0.9779 0.9786
( 0.0064) ( 0.0064)
γ -0.0569 -0.1047
( 0.1727)
α 0.54 0.55 0.55
(0.0243) (0.0248)
Table 2.4: Estimates of simulated data with endogenous components in the
spending rule.
Note: In the IV regression we use the lagged realizations of GDP as the instrument. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the α parameter are obtained through a bootstrapping
procedure based on 1000 replications of the residuals.
• Government Spending: “Total managed expenditure”. Source: UK
Budget, various years.
• Population: “Mid-year population estimates”. Source: ONS.
• Price deflator: “GDP Implicit Price Deflator”. Source: OECD.
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Figure 2.14: Durable goods multiplier and deviation from full information
Note: This figure plots the multipliers for durable goods and the deviation under partial information








X is alternatively the GSM and the NPV of the GSM and i = CA,UK,US.
United States
The following are the series for the US:
• Government Spending (Budget): “Total budget outlays”. Source: Fed-
eral Budget, various years.
• Government Spending (SPF): “Real Federal Government Consumption
Expenditures and Gross Investment”. Source: Survey of Professional
Forecasters (series id: RFEDGOV).
• Population: “Total Population: All Ages including Armed Forces Over-
seas”. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Census Bureau.
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Dev. Full Info NPV GSM (%)
Figure 2.15: NPV multipliers of consumption and investment and deviation
from full information
Note: This figure plots the NPV multipliers for consumption and investment and the deviation under








where X is alternatively the GSM and the NPV of the GSM and i = CA,UK,US.
• Price deflator: “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All
Items”. Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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LÜTKEPOHL, H. (2005): New introduction to multiple time series analysis,
Springer Science & Business Media.
MERTENS, K. AND M. O. RAVN (2011): “Understanding the Aggregate Ef-
fects of Anticipated and Unanticipated Tax Policy Shocks,” Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics, 14, 27–54.
MOUNTFORD, A. AND H. UHLIG (2009): “What are the effects of fiscal policy
shocks?” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 24, 960–992.
PESARAN, M. H. AND M. WEALE (2006): “Survey expectations,” Handbook of
economic forecasting, 1, 715–776.
RAMEY, V. A. (2011): “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s all in
the Timing,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 1–50.
RICCO, G. (2014): “A New Identification Of Fiscal Shocks Based On The In-
formation Flow,” mimeo.
88
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After the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, the relevance of financial frictions
in business cycle dynamics has been vastly investigated, with new strands
of literature highlighting the role of the financial sector as a source of busi-
ness cycle fluctuations and as a shock propagator (Brunnermeier et al., 2013).
From a normative viewpoint, the role of financial frictions has spurred a de-
bate on how to ensure stability in the financial system that has led to the
development of a new set of so called ”macroprudential” policy tools.1 This
label covers a variety of policies sharing the common objective of reducing
systemic risk in the economy and of mitigating the financial cycle (Claessens,
2014). Some of these tools are already part of the standard toolkit of financial
regulators.2
Their widespread adoption notwithstanding, surprisingly little quantita-
tive research has been performed so far on the effects of such policies on the
real economy. Most of the research on macroprudential policies is indeed the-
oretical and aimed at identifying the sources of systemic risk and at shaping
1It has to be acknowledged that economists working at the BIS first developed the concept
of macroprudential policies in the late 1970s. See Clement (2010).
2As a way of example, at the end of 2015 in Europe the national measures in the EU/EEA
notified to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), or of which the ESRB was aware, of
macroprudential interest were 213.
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optimal policy intervention.3 Thus, while it is well documented that macro-
prudential policies can help increase the soundness of the financial sector
and thus also improve the performance of the economy as a whole, a quanti-
tative assessment of the spillovers to the real economy is still lacking. Also,
a major shortcoming of most quantitative models with a financial sector are
usually solved performing a linear approximation around the steady state of
the economy. This in turn implies that the impact of the financial sector on
the economy is symmetric both in boom and in bust periods.
In this paper I attempt at quantitatively gauging the asymmetric impact
on the real economy of financial frictions and at estimating the effectiveness
of several macroprudential policies. I estimate the model on the Italian econ-
omy for two reasons. First, the financial frictions I want to investigate arise
from within the banking sector and influence quantities and prices of bank
loans to the economy. In this respect, the Italian financial system is an fit-
ting example, as financial intermediation is mainly performed by traditional
banks.4 Secondly, in the last decade Italy experienced a double dip recession
(see Figure 3.1) the first dip in 2009 was driven by the global turmoil after the
Lehman crack.
The second was related to the European Sovereign debt crisis, whose ef-
fects on the real economy are still present. Such dynamics allow to investigate
the ability of macroprudential policies to reduce the severity of crises arising
from different exogenous shocks. The key research questions of the paper
are then related to identify the impact on real variables of tensions arising in
the banking sector and to investigate whether the timely implementation of
macroprudential policies would have helped in mitigating the real effects of
financial crises. In other words, I question whether there exist a one-size-fits-
all macroprudential tool for dealing with financial crises.
I try and answer the above questions by making use of a DSGE model
with a banking sector where financial frictions can bite only occasionally.
This non-linearity within the banking sector should help in principle in iden-
tifying asymmetries in the cycle.5 It will also help in investigating the behav-
ior of macroprudential policies in a non-linear environment.
A further contribution of the paper is technical and is related to the esti-
3For a survey of the literature see for instance Galati and Moessner (2013).
4In 2013, banks accounted for almost 85 percent of total financial sector assets. The vast
majority of Italian banks runs a traditional business model where the prevailing items on the
asset side of the balance sheet are loans to the economy. The prevailing source of funding is
deposits and customers loans (IMF, 2013).
5It has already been shown in the literature that occasionally binding financial constraints
may give rise to asymmetric business cycles (Li and Dressler, 2011).
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Figure 3.1: Business cycle dynamics for output, consumption and investment
in Italy (1999-2014)












Note: This figure displays the dynamics of output, consumption and investment in Italy from 1999q1 to
2014q4. Series are detrended with a one-sided HP filter with smoothing parameter equal to 1600. Data
are reported in per cent.
mation of large non-linear DSGE models. The model I am dealing with has
indeed an occasionally binding constraint related to financial frictions in the
economy; this implies that the model operates under two regimes: one in
which financial frictions are in place and the other in which the allocation
of resources is not affected by financial constraints. Such non-linearity is in-
troduced to better capture the interaction between the financial system and
the real economy. However, so far one of the main hurdles for investigating
large non-linear models has been their computational complexity. Here I rely
on a method recently brought forward in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015b)
for solving this class of models. One of the advantages of this method lies in
its computational simplicity, which makes it possible to bring a medium scale
model to the data. I therefore introduce a new estimation technique for DSGE
models that does not rely on the estimation of the likelihood function. This
method, that is gaining popularity in other disciplines, is known as Approx-
imate Bayesian Computation (ABC, see Beaumont et al. 2002). I show that
ABC can be easily implemented for estimating non-linear DSGE models and
it provides several advantages compared to other methods currently used in
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the estimation of non-linear DSGE models, such as the Simulated Method
of Moments (Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı́rez 2007, Ruge-Murcia
2012). I show that the non-linear model is better able than linear models to
approximate the asymmetries that can be observed in the data. More pre-
cisely, the estimated model accurately replicates the negative skewness of
output and it better matches higher order moments (such as skewness and
kurtosis) of output, consumption and investment.
The current paper is related to two main strands of literature. First, it
is related to papers that try and embed macroprudential policies in DSGE
models with financial frictions (see for instance Kannan et al. 2012 and An-
geloni and Faia 2013). Most of these papers are however solved via a first
order approximation of the system around the steady state, thus assuming
that financial constraints are binding at any point in time.
Recently, however, some papers have investigated the properties of mod-
els à la Gertler and Karadi (2011) assuming that financial frictions are only
occasionally binding: Bocola (2014) is a paper very close to mine in terms
of modelling, although its focus is on the effects of sovereign default risk on
lending behavior. Prestipino (2014) also relies on a similar non-linear set up,
although the policy focus is not on preventive macroprudential policies but
on ex-post bail-outs.
The second strand of literature is related to solving and estimating non-
linear DSGE models with financial frictions. In this respect the paper most
close in spirit is Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a). In that paper, the authors
use the solution method discussed above for solving and estimating a DSGE
with an occasionally binding collateral constraint on housing and a zero lower
bound for the policy rate. They however estimate the model via maximum
likelihood, whereas this paper makes use of a more general estimation method,
that can be in principle applied to any non-linear model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 the key ingre-
dients of the model are introduced. In Section 3.3 the solution of the model
is presented along with the estimation strategy. In Section 3.4 the model is
actually brought to the data and the results discussed. In Section 3.5 I intro-
duce macroprudential policies and perform counterfactual exercises. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The model builds on a standard New Keynesian DSGE framework, enrichred
with a financial sector à la Gertler and Karadi (2011). In this model, house-
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holds provide labor services to the production sector but do not directly hold
physical capital. Instead, the financing of production is intermediated by
banks, which get funded by a combination of households’ bank loans and
internal equity and invest in both loans to firms and in government bonds.
The production sector is made of intermediate good producers, capital pro-
ducers and retailers. The distinction between intermediate good producers
and capital producers is introduced in order to have a real friction in invest-
ment, which is subject to adjustment costs. Retailers are instead introduced
in the model to keep nominal frictions separated from the rest of the model.
As the household and production sides of the economy are relatively stan-
dard I leave a more accurate description of these sectors to Appendix 3.7. In
what follows, I will mainly focus on the banking sector and on government
policies.
The banking sector
I assume that the representative household is made of a fraction of workers
while the remaining part is made of bankers. Each banker runs a bank. In
each period a fraction 1 − σ of bankers becomes workers within the family
and is replaced by an equal fraction of workers that become bankers. The
new bankers are endowed with funds provided by the household.
In each period t, the funds available to a banker are bank loans dt that are
bought by workers and real net worth nt, which arises from past earnings
(for surviving bankers) and from endowments from the household (for new
bankers). A banker uses these resources to buy private assets (loans) kt at
price pk,t,
6 and long-term government bonds bt at price pb,t. The balance
sheet of a banker then writes
pk,tkt + pb,tbt = nt + dt. (3.1)
At the end of period t returns from the two assets are accrued and are used
to repay the bank loans. The leftover is the net worth of the banker which
accumulates according to the following law of motion
nt = (1 + rk,t) pk,t−1kt−1 +(1+ rb,t)pb,t−1bt−1 − [1 + (1− τd)rd,t−1] dt−1 (3.2)
where rk,t, rb,t and rd,t are respectively the returns on firms’ loans, on
government bonds and on bank loans. Note that here I allow for the possi-
bility of introducing a tax on debt (τd) which for the moment is set to zero but
6The loans to the real economy are in fact a financial instrument that resembles more an
equity contract (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
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whose role will be highlighted at a latter stage when policy experiments will
be conducted.












Up to this point, the introduction of a banking sector does not give rise
to financial frictions per se and does not alter the dynamics of this economy.
The financial friction is therefore introduced in the form of a minimum reg-
ulatory capital requirement. More precisely, it is assumed that the banking
regulator requires that the discounted value of the bankers’ net worth should
be greater or equal than the current value of assets, weighted by their rela-
tive risk. Hence, denoting with α ∈ (0, 1] the risk weight on loans to the real
economy and with ααb ∈ (0, 1] the risk weight for government bonds, the
regulatory constraint writes:
vt ≥ α(pk,tkt + αbpb,tbt). (3.3)
To solve the banker’s problem we adopt a guess and verify approach. We
guess that the value function is a linear object of the form vt = γtnt, where γt
can be interpreted as the marginal value of an extra unit of net worth. Then










subject to constraint (3.3), with Ωt ≡ 1− σ+ σγt. Hence the first order condi-












Ωt+1 [rb,t+1 − (1− τd) rd,t]
}
= ααbµt (3.5)
µt [γtnt − α (pk,tkt + αbpb,tbt)] = 0 (3.6)
where µt is the multiplier for constraint (3.3). The multiplier can be inter-
preted as the shadow value of relaxing the credit constraint. Therefore, it is
also a measure of the severity of the financial friction. Indeed, note that when
the constraint is not binding (i.e. µt = 0), we get that rk,t = rb,t = rd,t−1 so
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that the financial friction is shut down and the frictionless economy alloca-
tion is recovered.7 Another interpretation of the constraint being not binding
is that when µt = 0 the economy is in a Modigliani-Miller setup: it is in-
deed indifferent for the bank to hold equity and debt, as their rate of return
is equivalent.
Another useful remark is the following. In the light of our guess of the
value function, we can rewrite (3.3) as follows




has a straightforward interpretation as a capital ratio. In
other words, in order to comply with regulatory requests, the bank needs to
keep this ratio at a level at least equal to ϕt.
8
As in Bocola (2014) and in Prestipino (2014), but in contrast with the orig-
inal contribution by Gertler and Karadi (2011), I do not impose that the con-
straint is binding all the time. I treat it instead as an occasionally binding
constraint, thus introducing a relevant non-linearity in the model.
To see the relevance of such assumption, in Figure 3.2 the amount of
bankers’ net worth along with the difference (in logs) between the left and
the right-hand sides of inequality (3.7) is plotted.
More precisely, Figure (3.2) draws from a simulation of the model, with
parameters values equal to the ones resulting from the calibration and esti-
mation exercises conducted in the following sections. On the horizontal axis
I plot bankers’ net worth in log-deviation from the steady state. On the ver-
tical axis I plot inequality (3.7) in logs. If the constraint was always binding,
the difference between the left and the right hand sides of inequality (3.7)
would be zero as the net worth of bankers would always equate the right
hand side of the equation. This is indeed what actually happens when the
model is linearized around the steady state (linear model).
If the model is solved assuming that the constraint is binding only occa-
sionally, instead, there are times in which the net value of bankers exceeds the
minimum level required by the regulator. An interesting feature of the non
linearity is that when the constraint is not binding the relationship between
the net worth of banks and the amount of assets held (ie. the amount of loans
to the economy and of government bonds) is less stringent. This occurs more
often when banks are well capitalized. In other words, the probability of the
constraint being slack is higher with high values of n̂t.
7Throughout this section I set for simplicity τd = 0.
8We assume that capital regulation is perfectly enforceable and cannot be circumvented.
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Figure 3.2: Occasionally binding credit constraint

































Note: This figure plots data from a simulation of the model for 1000 periods. It displays on the horizontal
axis the value of nt in long-deviation from the steady state, while on the horizontal axis the log of both
sides of the inequality (3.7). The values of the parameters are the ones derived from the results of the
calibration and estimation exercises discussed in the following sections.
The above described features of this environment can be recovered also
in Bocola (2014) and in Prestipino (2014). The main difference with these
papers is however that for the solution and estimation of the model I rely on
methods that allow to deal with several shocks and frictions, thus effectively
estimating a medium scale non-linear DSGE model with a large number of
parameters.
Turning back to the solution of the bankers’ problem, if we substitute
equation (3.2) and the FOCs into the value function we get
vt = αµt (pk,tkt + αbpb,tbt) + β
λt+1
λt
Ωt+1 [1 + (1− τd)rd,t]nt
then using FOCs and the guess for the value function we can recover the
value of γt:















Ωt+1 [1 + (1− τd)rd,t]
}]
. (3.8)
In the first expression it can be seen that the marginal value of an extra unit of
net worth can be decomposed into two terms: the return on equity when the
constraint is not binding and the gain that comes from relaxing the regulatory
capital constraint.
The description of the banking sector is concluded by constructing the
aggregate law of motion for the net worth of the banking sector as a whole.
Aggregate net worth is made of the sum of the net worth of old and new
bankers, weighted by their number. The old bankers’ net worth is given by
combining (3.1) and (3.2). As for new bankers, their net worth is given by
their endowment. We assume that the transfer to new bankers is proportional
to the beginning of period net worth nt−1, with proportionality coefficient ω.
On aggregate, the law of motion of real net worth nt is thus
nt = σ [(rk,t − rd,t−1)pk,t−1kt−1 + (rb,t − rd,t−1)pb,t−1bt−1]
+ [σ(1 + (1− τd)rd,t−1) + ω]nt−1.
Government
The government finances its public expenditure by raising taxes and issu-
ing long term bonds. Long-term bonds are modeled assuming that in each
period only a fraction δπ of them comes to maturity. On the remaining frac-
tion of bonds the government pays instead a coupon ρ. In order to introduce
sovereign risk in the model, we assume that the fraction of short-term bonds
may be subject to the shock ϕb,t. Such a shock implies a reprofiling of debt
maturity: in case of a negative shock, the government is unexpectedly length-
ening the maturity structure of its bond stock and partly postponing the re-
imbursements of short term bonds, thus implying a partial default. Then,
denoting δ̃π = δπe
ϕb,t , the government budget constraint writes
pb,t
[




δ̃π + (1− δ̃π)ρ
]
+ gt − Taxt,
where the return on bonds will be equal to
1 + rb,t =
δ̃π + (1− δ̃π)(ρ+ pb,t)
pb,t−1
eϕb,t .
Total taxes are equal to
Taxt = Tt + τcct + τwwtht + τdrd,t−1dt−1.
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where T is a lump sum tax, τc is a consumption tax, τw is a tax on labor and
τd is a tax on deposits. We assume that government spending obeys the fiscal
rule9
ĝt = γg ĝt−1 + λg b̂t + ϕg,t
where ĝt and b̂t denote log-deviations from the steady state and εg,t is a dis-
turbance to government spending.
Monetary policy is captured by a simple Taylor rule






(log yt − log yt−4)
]
+ ϕR,t
where 1 + πat =
∏3
p=0(1 + πt−p) and
1 + it = (1 + rd,t)Et(1 + πt+1).
In counterfactual experiments, we will allow for a time varying tax on
bank debt and to a richer specification of the Taylor rule.
3.3 Model solution and empirical strategy
Solution of the model
One of the key challenges of the model is related to the non-linearity of the
system and to the related intractability for estimation purposes. Dealing with
a large non-linear model is still considered a daunting task for practitioners:
accurate methods such as those grouped under the label of ”global methods”
are usually computationally intensive and can only deal with rather few state
variables.10
For models with occasionally binding constraints, an interesting alterna-
tive to these methods has been recently put forward by Guerrieri and Ia-
coviello (2015b). The basic intuition behind the suggested method is to ap-
proximate the policy functions via a first-order piecewise linear approxima-
tion around the steady state of the model. The method builds on the fact
that models with an occasionally binding constraint can be summarized by
two regimes: one in which the constraint is binding and the other in which
9To ensure the stationarity of bond dynamics, an endogenous fiscal rule is needed as
shown in Bohn (1995).
10This is one of the main differences of this paper with Bocola (2014), where global methods
are used in the solution of the model. This implies that in that paper estimation has to be
performed in two steps, given the high computational burden.
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the constraint is not binding.11 The linearization of each regime is performed
around the steady state, using a guess-and-verify approach to identify the
transition path from one regime to the other. The interested reader can find
an accurate description of the algorithm along with the minimal properties
of the model required for applying the method in the original paper by Guer-
rieri and Iacoviello (2015b).
An important assumption for the solution method to work is that in the
long run, in absence of shocks, the model has to return to its unique non-
stochastic steady state. In the present paper, we assume that the steady state
exists and is located in the regime where the financial constraint is binding.
When we will discuss the actual calibration and estimation of the model, we
will check that the value of the multiplier at steady state is effectively greater
than zero (ie. the constraint is binding). 12
The solution of the current model, under the proposed method, can be
written as
Xt = P (Xt−1, εt)Xt−1 +Q (Xt−1, εt) εt (3.9)
where Xt is the vector of endogenous variables - both jump and predeter-
mined - while εt is the vector of the structural shocks. It can be seen that the
non-linearity of the model is preserved also in this first-order approximation
since the transition matrices P and Q are time-varying.
Estimation strategy
The solution technique discussed above poses a challenge in terms of estima-
tion, since the likelihood of the system - although in principle observable -
is computationally hard to recover. In principle one could still make use of
maximum likelihood methods to estimate the system of equations (3.9). In-
deed, this is what Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a) do when they bring their
model to the data. However, in what follows I explore a more general esti-
mation procedure that could in principle fit any non-linear DSGE model. To
the best of my knowledge, this is one of the first papers where this method
is employed for estimating a DSGE.13 For the model at hand, the estimation
11The argument can be made more general in case of more than one occasionally binding
constraint.
12Note however that this is an unrequired step in the procedure, as the linearization under
the two regimes could be performed around a different point.
13A New Keynesian model in continuous time is estimated with this technique in Hayo
and Niehof (2014), while a more general discussion of this method in DSGEs, with an appli-
cation to the Zero Lower Bound is Scalone (2015).
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procedure I propose is equivalent in terms of computation time to estimating
the model via maximum likelihood.
The method belongs to the class of likelihood-free methods and is called
Adaptive Bayesian Computation (ABC, see Beaumont et al. 2002). In essence,
the ABC method builds on an MCMC sampler, whose acceptance/rejection
criterion is given by the distance of a given set of simulated moments from
their empirical counterparts.
This method has two main advantages compared to other methods. First,
alike to the Simulated Method of Moments it implies that one does not need
to compute the likelihood of the system. This is particularly useful when the
likelihood is not available or hard to compute. Secondly, and in opposition to
the Simulated Method of Moments, since the ABC is a Bayesian method, one
can make use of priors to inform the exploration of the space of parameters.
This is a huge practical advantage, since priors can be easily derived from the
literature or - as I do in the actual estimation of the model at hand - from the
estimation of a linear version of the model (for example assuming that the
constraint is always binding). More discussion of the estimation method can
be found in Appendix 3.8.
3.4 Implementation and data
Turning to the actual implementation, the total number of parameters in the
model is 42. I split the set of parameters into two subsets. A first subset of
23 parameters is recovered via calibration of steady state values. A discus-
sion of the calibration of these parameters as well as the actual value of the
parameters is reported in the next section. The remaining 19 parameters are
estimated. I run draws of parameters values using as priors the results of a
maximum likelihood estimation on a linear model where I assume that the
regulatory constraint is always binding.14
The data used in the estimation are seven Italian macroeconomic series
taken at quarterly frequency in the period 1999q1 to 2014q4. We take real
per-capita consumption, GDP and investment. For inflation we take the Har-
monised Index of Consumer Prices. We then take three series for interest
rates: the bank bonds rate Rd is the average rate on bank bonds, the return
on physical capital Rk is represented by the interest rate on loans to non-
financial corporations, while the interest rate on government bonds Rb is an
index produced by the Bank of Italy known as ”Rendistato”. This index is
the average yield on a basket of government securities weighted by their
14The prior values for this preliminary linear estimation are taken from Cahn et al. (2014).
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outstanding amount. All the series are detrended with a one-sided HP-filter
with smoothing parameter set at 1600.
The set of moments I use for estimation is dictated by the fit of the lin-
ear version of the model at hand. More precisely, I first estimate the linear
version of the model in order to recover prior values for the ABC estimation
phase. Then I simulate the linear model and compute a long list of moments:
the variance of the above seven series, their correlation, 1st and 2nd order au-
tocovariances. Of this large set of moments, I retain for the ABC estimation
phase only those whose sign is correctly identified by simulated data from
the linear model. I therefore end up with 23 moments to be matched (see
Table 3.3).
Calibration
A subset of 23 parameters is calibrated in such a way that the steady-state
value of some variables matches the average in the period 1999-2014 of their
empirical counterparts. The parameter values are reported in Table 3.1.
The discount factor β is set to 0.991 in order to match the annual Italian
banking sector average yield on bonds of 3,68% between 1999 and 2014.15
The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is instead fixed at 2, a
value that is standard in a vast macro literature (eg. see Smets and Wouters
2007). The degree of habit formation and the parameter for adjustment costs
in investment are taken from the estimation performed by Cahn et al. (2014)
(CMS from now on).
Then, I set parameters for the adjustment cost function reported in equa-
tion (3.12): a0 is chosen to obtain a normalized steady state capital utilization
of 1, while the value for a1 is taken from CMS. The scale parameter for labor
supply, χ, is chosen to match a steady state value for labor equal to .33, as is
standard in the literature. The depreciation rate δ and the capital share in the
production function, θ, are also assigned standard values.
The values for parameters related to the nominal rigidity block are taken
from CMS. Among those, the product elasticity of substitution is set at a level
that implies a price markup of 20 per cent, while firms are assumed to be able
to reoptimize their prices once every three quarters.
Turning to parameters related to the banking sector, the survival rate for
bankers, which implies an average length of life of a banker of about 16 years,
is taken from CMS. The risk weight parameter α is instead chosen to match
the annual Italian banking sector average yield on loans to the non-financial
15Indeed, at the steady state the following relationship holds: 1 = (1 +Rd)β.
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Table 3.1: Calibration values
Parameter Value Description
β 0.991 discount factor
η 0.55 degree of habit formation
ζ 2 inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply
νi 3.31 investment adj. costs
a0 .035 utilization cost parameter
a1 .41 utilization cost parameter
χ 9192 labor supply scale parameter
δ .025 depreciation rate
θ .3 capital share
Nominal rigidity parameters
θp 6 product elasticity of substitution
ξp .66 price reoptimization probability
ιp .17 degree of inflation indexation
Banking sector parameters
σ .985 bankers survival rate
α 0.18 risk weight on loans
αb 1.1368 relative risk weight on bonds
ω̂ 0.00065 new bankers’ endowments
Fiscal parameters
τc .061 consumption tax
τw .082 labor tax
δπ .0412 share of short-term government bonds
ρ 0.005 coupon on long-term bonds
Steady state values
b/y 3.7 steady state debt-to-gdp ratio
g/y 0.19 steady state share of government consumption
π 0 steady state inflation
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sector. Such a yield was equal to 3,94 per cent on an annual basis between
1999 and 2014. The parameter governing the relative risk of government
bonds as compared to the loans to firms, αb, is also taken to match the av-
erage interest rate on Italian government bonds from 1999 to 2014. Such a
rate is the Rendistato yield, which on average was equal to 3,98 per cent in
the reference period. Lastly, the parameter related to the endowment of new
bankers, ω̂, targets the average capital ratio for Italian banks from 1999 to
2014, equal to 11.5 per cent.16 Note in passing, that such calibration of bank-
ing sector parameters implies that the multiplier at steady state is positive
(µ = 0.005), thus implying that the reference regime is the one in which the
financial constraint is binding.17
Moving to fiscal parameters, the value for τc corresponds to the average
amount of VAT as a percentage of GDP (6.1 per cent). The value of the la-
bor tax parameter τw corresponds to the revenue of labor taxation (for em-
ployed paid by employees) as a percentage of GDP (8.2 per cent). The source
for these values is Eurostat (2014). As for parameters related to government
bonds, the share of short-term government bonds, δπ, is chosen to match the
average residual life (6,07 years) of bonds traded on the MTS market, the
most relevant trading venue for Italian government bonds (source: Bank of
Italy). The coupon paid on long term issuances, ρ, is instead set to a value
that matches the average coupon on BTPs issued from 1999 to 2014 (1,95% a
year, source: Italian Treasury).
Two steady state relationships are also imposed: the debt to GDP ratio
is set at 3.7, which is the equivalent at a quarterly frequency of the average
debt-to-GDP per year in Italy 1999-2014 (92.5 per cent). The ratio of govern-
ment spending over GDP is instead set at the value of 19 per cent, as in the
data. These two ”great ratios” are computed based on data from the Italian
quarterly national accounts, provided by Istat. The amount of government
debt is computed as the outstanding amount of general government secu-
rities (source: Bank of Italy). Lastly, inflation at the steady state is set for
simplicity (and in line with the literature) at zero per cent.
16The capital ratio series is available from the IMF at a semiannual frequency from 1999 to
2011 and is given by the ratio of total regulatory capital over risk-weighted assets. For more
recent years I make use of quarterly data from the Bank of Italy.
17Detailed computations of the steady state of the model are reported in a Technical Ap-
pendix, available upon request.
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Estimation Results
The estimation chain is made of 100,000 draws with an acceptance rate equal
to 21.7%. The results of the estimation are reported in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Estimation Results
Parameter Prior Prior Prior Posterior Posterior
shape mean s.d. mean s.d.
(linear (non-linear
model) model)
κπ gamma 2.1996 0.3 1.6201 0.3621
κy gamma 1.0137 0.1 0.7134 0.1325
λg beta -0.6065 1 -1.8541 0.8498
ρc beta 0.3317 0.15 0.3575 0.1010
ρk beta 0.0816 0.15 0.0653 0.924
ρi beta 0.2216 0.15 0.2761 0.1132
ρz beta 0.5807 0.15 0.6067 0.0956
ρb beta 0.7655 0.15 0.7796 0.0893
ρg beta 0.9899 0.15 0.7372 0.2140
ρr beta 0.3865 0.15 0.4012 0.1008
γg beta 0.2165 0.15 0.2272 0.1060
ρmp beta 0.3029 0.15 0.3163 0.1043
σc inv. gamma 0.0314 2 0.0234 0.0248
σk inv. gamma 0.0308 2 0.0216 0.0182
σi inv. gamma 0.0529 2 0.0383 0.0285
σz inv. gamma 0.0308 2 0.0234 0.0150
σb inv. gamma 0.1524 2 0.1000 0.0566
σg inv. gamma 0.0362 2 0.0211 0.0140
σr inv. gamma 0.0306 2 0.0495 0.0323
Note: This table reports the estimated values of parameters under an Adaptive Bayesian Com-
putation algorithm based on 100,000 draws from prior distributions. The values for priors are
retrieved from a ML estimation of the linearized model, assuming that the credit constraint is
always binding. The prior means for this preliminary linear estimation are derived from Cahn
et al. (2014).
Estimated parameters can be grouped in two subgroups: the first is re-
lated to policy parameters, namely the coefficients of the Taylor rule and the
endogenous response of government spending to public debt. The second
subgroup is made of parameters related to the shocks in the economy. First,
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it is interesting to note that Taylor rule parameters have significantly lower
values in the non-linear model. This may be due to the fact that in order to
match the big swings observed in the data, in the linear model a more aggres-
sive monetary policy is required. On the other hand, the parameter related
to the endogenous component in the fiscal rule takes a much higher value in
absolute terms in the non-linear version of the model.
The remaining parameters are the autoregressive parameters and the stan-
dard deviations of the shocks. Concerning the former, it is interesting to note
that the autoregressive parameters are basically confirmed both in the lin-
ear model (ie. the prior) and in the non-linear one, whereas the variances of
these shocks tend to differ in the two models. More precisely, we find that
the value of most of the variances turns out to be lower in the non-linear ver-
sion of the model (with the exception of the variances of the confidence and
of capital quality shocks). This suggests that part of the exogenous variation
in the linear model is endogenized in the non-linear version. In other words,
the non-linear model is better able to endogenously generate business cycle
fluctuations, whereas the linearized model needs to rely more on external
disturbances to match the big swings observed in the data.
In Figure 3.3 we plot the estimated multiplier, along with the filtered se-
ries of output, in log-deviation from its steady state.18
The multiplier is greater than zero in 33 quarters, thus implying that the
constraint is binding almost half (52%) of the time. The multiplier reached
its highest value in 2009Q1, in correspondence with the Lehman crisis. It is
found to be binding also during the sovereign debt crisis (in 2011-2012) and
after the burst of the dot-com bubble, in 2002, in conjunction with a slow-
down in output growth.
Matching moments
Turning to moments matching, in Table 3.3 we plot the values of the moments
used in the estimation exercise both in the data and in the linear model.
The non-linear model represents a significant improvement in terms of
variance matching compared to its linear counterpart. This comes at the ex-
pense of matching correlations among the selected variables, whereas the
performance in terms of matching autocorrelations (with one or two lags)
18The filtered series for output is obtained as follows. First, filtered shocks are recovered
applying a standard Kalman smoother around the linearized model (using as observables
output, consumption, investment and inflation) with parameters values equal to the posterior
mean, assuming that the constraint is always binding. Then the series of shocks is introduced
into the non-linear model and solved with the method of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015b).
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Table 3.3: Empirical and Simulated Moments
Moment Data Non-linear Linear
model model
Standard y 1.28 1.27 5.57
deviation c 1.20 1.68 6.40
i 2.58 6.32 36.99
Rd 0.36 2.90 13.77
Rb 0.57 6.87 43.49
Rk 0.64 8.74 45.44
π 0.67 2.12 7.73
Correlation y, i 0.91 0.58 0.79
y, π 0.37 0.69 0.60
c, Rb 0.51 -0.05 0.10
c, Rk 0.50 -0.01 0.10
i, π 0.39 0.08 0.27
Rb, Rk 0.65 0.88 0.97
First order y 0.89 0.73 0.85
autocovariance c 0.66 0.53 0.72
i 0.84 0.93 0.96
Rd 0.64 0.85 0.90
Rb 0.82 0.98 0.98
Rk 0.59 0.95 0.94
π 0.92 0.49 0.43
Second order y 0.75 0.07 0.03
autocovariance Rk 0.83 0.38 0.38
π 0.58 0.15 0.14
This table reports the value of the moments used in the estimation of the model. The estimated
moments for the linear and non-linear models are computed via a simulation for 1,000 periods
of the two models, with parameters values taken from the estimation above described. The
values of Rd, Rb,Rk and π are annualized. Standard deviation for each series is multiplied by
100.
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Figure 3.3: Estimated Multiplier and Output










This figure plots the filtered value of the multiplier (left-hand scale) along with the actual dy-
namics of output (right-hand scale).
is relatively similar in the linear and non-linear models. The importance of
solving the model non-linearly can be gauged when one moves to higher or-
der moments. What the non-linear version of the model adds is indeed an
asymmetric behavior of variables in boom and bust periods. This can be ob-
served in Figure 3.4 where we plot the density of output both in the data and
in a 1,000 period simulation of the two models.
It can be noted that the distribution of output in the data displays a fat
left tail, which is mainly associated to the 2009 slump. The linear model
approximates the density pretty badly, due to the fact that linear models are
by definition symmetric.
The above fact is more rigorously tested in Table 3.4, where I report skew-
ness and kurtosis of output, consumption and investment in the two versions
of the model and in a simple VAR(1), with parameters values as in the pre-
ceding section and simulating the model for 1,000 periods.
It can be noticed that with respect to output and investment, the non-
linear model is the only one that is able to accurately match the negative
skewness of the two distributions, thus confirming the quantitative relevance
of the occasionally binding constraint, that induce asymmetric cycles with
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Table 3.4: Asymmetry of real variables
Output Consumption Investment
Skewness
Non-linear model -0.42 -0.40 -1.59
p-value < 0.1% < 0.1% < 0.1%
Linear model -0.21 -0.11 -0.19
p-value 7.15% 34.93% 11.24%
VAR(1) 0.11 0.12 -0.01
p-value 33.76% 30.75% 94.01%
Data -1.70 -0.54 -1.19
p-value 0.26% 22.42% 1.90%
Kurtosis
Non-linear model 3.42 3.22 5.06
p-value 1.6% 16.7% < 0.1%
Linear model 3.02 3.19 3.09
p-value 81.28% 21.87% 49.07%
VAR(1) 2.93 2.99 2.93
p-value 72.24% 97.89% 71.46%
Data 6.90 3.27 4.72
p-value 0.05% 40.26% 1.95%
Deepness (Triples test)
Non-linear model -5.33 -4.40 -40.12
p-value < 0.1% 0.11% < 0.1%
Linear model -1.86 -0.03 0.48
p-value 6.31% 97.85% 63.11%
VAR(1) 1.15 0.62 -0.11
p-value 25.12% 53.73% 90.93%
Data -2.81 -1.69 -2.53
p-value 0.5% 9.13% 1.13%
Note: This table reports skewness, kurtosis and ”deepness” of output, consumption and investment com-
puted from a simulation for 1,000 periods of the models, with parameters values taken from the estima-
tion described in the text, and from the data. The numbers in italic are the p-values for the D’Agostino
test (for skewness) and of the Anscombe test (for kurtosis). The null hypotesis for the D’Agostino test is
that skewness is not significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis for the Anscombe test is that
kurtosis is not significantly different from 3 (as in the normal distribution). The Jarque-Bera test has the
null hypothesis that the series is normally distributed. The null hypotesis for testing deepness has that
the data are symmetrically distributed about an unknown median.
109
Figure 3.4: Output density












Note: In this figure the densities of output, consumption and investment both in the data and
in the models are reported. Density is computed through a normal kernel smoothing estimate
over 100 equally spaced points. The density for the linear and non-linear models is computed
via a 1,000 periods simulation of the models, with parameters values taken from the estimation
and calibration exercises above described.
crisis episodes being deeper than booms. Consumption is instead found not
to be significantly skewed in the data (and in the linear models). Such find-
ing can be easily explained with the the desire of households to smooth con-
sumption over the business cycle. The non-linear DSGE produces a figure for
consumption skewness not so distant from the one in the data, although the
null hypothesis is rejected.
Turning to kurtosis, the data reveal that output and investment display a
leptokurtic distribution, thus implying a higher peak and longer tails com-
pared to the normal distribution. These features of the data are confirmed in
the non-linear model, whereas they are rejected in the linear models.
As a last robustness check on the asymmetric distribution of the data, I
perform a non-parametric test developed by Randles et al. (1980) known as
the Triple test. The test aims at identifying ”deepness” of the data, which
intuitively can be defined as a feature that emerges when in the series the
troughs of the cycles are deeper than its peaks are tall (Razzak, 2001). Its
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null hypothesis is that the distribution is symmetric about an unknown me-
dian. The outcome of this test on the data confirms the previous findings on
skewness: output and investment data are found to possess depth (or neg-
ative asymmetry) at a 5% level. Such feature of the data is captured by the
non-linear model, but not by the linear models.
3.5 Counterfactuals with macroprudential policies
In this section we build on the estimation results to quantitatively assess the
impact of macroprudential policies on the real economy. Here macropruden-
tial policies are introduced as three different tools. First of all, I introduce a
Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) in the banking sector. The CCyB can
be viewed as the main macroprudential tool of the Basel III regulatory frame-
work and it is aimed at ensuring ”that banking sector capital requirements
take account of the macro-financial environment in which banks operate”
(BCBS, 2011). In practical terms, it implies that the regulatory capital ratio
should increase during the positive phase of the financial cycle, in order to
make the banking sector more resilient.
In theory, however, a direct intervention in the banking system, is not
the only macroprudential policy option available. Indeed, after the Great
Financial Crisis of 2008 new streams of literature have been explored (and old
streams of literature revived) investigating the role of more standard tools,
such as monetary and fiscal policies, in stabilizing the financial cycle. On the
monetary policy side, a fierce debate started on whether it is appropriate for
monetary policy to take into account financial conditions in the Taylor rule
or not (see for example Gambacorta and Signoretti 2014). It has also been
observed that fiscal policy can play and active role in mitigating the effects
of the financial cycle via Pigouvian taxation (Jeanne and Korinek 2010). I
therefore will introduce in the current setting, as potential alternatives to the
countercyclical capital buffer, a enriched version of the Taylor rule and a tax
on excessive banks leverage, with the aim of quantitatively investigating the
behavior of these various policies through the cycle.
Therefore I will focus on the following three tools.
Countercyclical capital buffer
I introduce the countercyclical capital buffer assuming that the banking reg-
ulator can make the capital requirement procyclical and dependent on the
credit-to-gdp gap (CGG). This policy tool has indeed a real-life counterpart
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in the Countercyclical Capital Buffer introduced in Basel III.19 Specifically, I
assume that under this policy the α parameter in equation 3.7 is not fixed
anymore, but varies through the cycle according to the following formula:
αt = α+ λαĈGGt
where ĈGGt is defined as in Basel III as current credit to the economy (kt−1)









In what follows λα is set at the value 1.5, which implies that the counter-
cyclical add-on can reach a maximum value of about 2.5% in the simulation
exercises. This is indeed the maximum value of the buffer envisaged in the
Basel III accords.
Countercyclical fiscal policy
As an alternative to the countercyclical capital buffer, I assume that the pol-
icymaker can tame the financial cycle via the introduction of a time-varying
tax on bank debt, which is linked to the growth of the credit-to-GDP gap as
follows:
τd,t = τd + λdĈGGt.
This policy has no immediate real-life counterpart, but has been proposed
by several academics and policymakers as a way of reducing the overall level
of systemic risk in the economy (Kashkari, 2016). One can think of it as a
policy wedge that is introduced with the aim of discouraging excessive credit
to the real economy. The policy works through the asset pricing equations
that determine the supply of credit (equations 3.4 and 3.5). An increase in
the leverage tax leads to higher interest rates on loans to the real economy
and government debt, thus leading to a tightening of credit supply and an
overall reduction in new lending. As for the calibration of such instrument,
in the following simulations we set the parameter λd at .9, thus implying a
maximum tax/subsidy rate equal to about 10% across the cycle. However,
we also perform some sensitivity analysis on alternative values of λd. Note
that the introduction of a leverage tax is partly akin to a capital requirement




As a last option, the credit-to-GDP gap is introduced as an extra variable in
the Taylor rule:






(log yt − log yt−4) + λiĈGGt
]
+ ϕR,t.
Such an extended policy rule and its stabilization properties have been
extensively studied both at a theoretical level and at a quantitative one20 and
it is a policy that has been employed by central banks to tackle bubbles in
some asset markets.21 The parameter λi is assigned the value of 0.05, which
implies that the risk free rate is raised by up to 2% (at an annual frequency)
in the boom phase of the credit cycle.
Effectiveness of policies under different shocks
As a first step, I will consider the effects of the different policies taking each
shock in isolation. In what follows I therefore analyze the behavior of some
relevant variables in a setting where I artificially generate a boom-bust episode
with a sequence of positive realizations of a shock followed by a sequence of
negative realizations of the same shock.
The path I will simulate is for the capital quality shock, assuming twelve
periods of growth followed by twelve periods of abrupt, negative values for
the shock. The capital quality shock, as introduced in Gertler and Karadi
(2011), has a straightforward interpretation as a pure financial shock that af-
fects the return from capital investment. As can be seen in Figure 3.5, the
shock sequence induces a growth in real variables such as output, consump-
tion and investment, with a long lasting recession following the realization
of negative shocks.
The simulation assumes that the economy starts from the steady state,
where the credit friction is binding. The occurence of several positive shocks
induces a relaxation of the constraint, which becomes not binding, as can be
gauged by the dynamics of the multiplier in Figure 3.6.
Then, the bust phase induces a sudden tightening of the constraint. In
terms of effectiveness of policies, it can be noted that the introduction of a
countercyclical element in monetary policy leads to the most pronounced
20See ex multis Curdia and Woodford (2010), Cúrdia and Woodford (2015) and Gambacorta
and Signoretti (2014).
21A recent case that has been intensely debated is the one of Sweden, where the Riksbank
in recent years has pursued a relatively restrictive monetary policy in order to reduce risks
stemming from the housing market (Svensson, 2016).
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Figure 3.5: Response to a capital quality shock
























No policy CCyB Tax on leverage Monetary Policy
Note: This figure displays the response of output, consumption and investment to a sequence of capital
quality shocks under different policy scenarios in deviation from the ”no policy” case. Values are in per
cent. Inflation is converted at annual values.
impact on output: it reduces its growth in the boom phase and smooths out
its fall in the crisis episode, with a faster return to the steady state.
On the other hand, the introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer
does not seem to play a significant role in the boom phase, while it slightly
attenuates the financial friction - and thus mitigates the fall in investment -
in the bust phase. This is indeed a key result that can be gauged only with
a non-linear model. Indeed, part of the reason for the ineffectiveness of the
CCyB lies in the fact that the CCyB is a policy that directly targets the regu-
latory constraint of bankers. However, in ”good times” this constraint is not
binding and thus the behavior of bankers during this period is not directly
affected by the policy. The CCyB has nonetheless an indirect effect on the real
economy even when the constraint is not binding, via the expectations of the
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No policy CCyB Tax on leverage Monetary Policy
Note: This figure displays the response of different policy tools to a sequence of capital quality shocks.
The interest rate is converted at annual frequency. The values for the capital ratio, the tax on leverage and
on the interest rate are in per cent.
agents concerning the intensity of the credit friction in future periods. Such
an indirect effect seems however rather limited in the quantitative analysis.
At the same time, in times of crisis the existence of a countercyclical cap-
ital buffer provides two benefits in terms of financial frictions. In the first
place, the bankers enter in the crisis with a higher level of net worth com-
pared to the ”no policy” case. Second, the policy, as constructed in the model,
implies that in the crisis period the credit constraint is relaxed (ie. the value
of α falls below its steady state level) thus implying that less net worth is re-
quired to provide funding to the real economy and this relaxes the intensity
of the credit friction.
Turning to the impact on consumption and investment, a rather different
picture emerges when considering fiscal policy vis-à-vis monetary policy and
the CCyB. Fiscal policy seems to be most effective in smoothing investment,
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but this comes at the expenses of consumption, which is slightly hampered
at the trough of the crisis.
Lastly, inflation reacts in a significant way only when monetary policy is
actively fighting the credit cycle. This is a side effect of monetary policy and
highlights the dilemma faced by a central bank that aims at simultaneously
targeting both inflation and excessive credit growth.
The dynamics of policy variables during this boom-bust episode can be
gauged in Figure 3.6. In the CCyB regime the capital ratio is enriched of
a countercyclical add-on that reaches a maximum of 0.5% during the boom
phase. The accumulation of this buffer implies that when a series of negative
shocks hits, the financial sector has more net worth compared to the baseline
scenario and thus it can cope with a slightly higher capital ratio. The rea-
son is that under the CCyB regime, during crisis times the marginal value of
an extra unit of net-worth may be lower than in the baseline scenario. Thus
when a CCyB is in place, the capital ratio evolves partly because of the me-
chanical effect of the CCyB and partly because of an endogenous response of
γt, the marginal value of bankers’ net worth.
Alternatively, the policymaker can let the tax on leverage vary with the
credit-to-gdp gap. The dynamics of the tax is reported in the second panel
of the Figure. It can be noted that the tax is increasing (up to 3%) during the
boom and becomes a transfer in the crisis period. Lastly, the dynamics of the
risk free rate are reported. Interestingly, adding an extra term in the Taylor
rule implies that the interest rate tends to be lower in booms and higher in
busts, mainly as a result of the endogenous response of inflation. Also, note
that the response of the interest rate is highly asymmetric in boom and bust.
Note also that fiscal policy affects the interest rate, while the CCyB does not.
The above described responses however are heavily dependent on the
kind of shock hitting the economy. In other words, the policy tools above
described can be effective only when the cycle is driven by shocks directly
related to the accumulation of capital. If the boom and the subsequent bust
is driven by other forces, the tools can prove less effective. Indeed, suppose
that the economy is hit by a different shock, say a productivity shock (see
Figure 3.7).
In this case, policies are very much ineffective in contrasting such dynam-
ics and the simple reason behind this result is that productivity is a variable
that does not directly enter in the reaction function of the policymaker.
Hence, several conclusions can be drawn from these experiments. First,
monetary policy when enriched of a countercyclical component, can be prove
rather effective in smoothing output dynamics. On the other hand, due to the
inner nature of the non-linearity, the countercyclical capital buffer is less ef-
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No policy CCyB Tax on leverage Monetary Policy
Note: This figure displays the response of output, consumption and investment to a sequence of produc-
tivity shocks under different policy scenarios in deviation from the ”no policy” case. Values are in per
cent.
fective. Also, the effectiveness of all of the above policies is highly dependent
of the shocks hitting the economy. Quantitatively, these policies prove more
effective when the economy is hit by financial shocks that directly affect the
banking sector.
Counterfactuals
In this section I will investigate the features of our economy under the base-
line case and in the three policy counterfactuals. In order to do so, I simulate
the model for 1000 periods with no macroprudential policies in place. Then
I use the same shock sequence from the baseline case in three conterfactual
experiments, in each of which I activate a distinct macroprudential policy. I
then compute some features of interest of these economies, such as the vari-
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ance of real variables (output, consumption and investment), the number of
periods spent with binding financial frictions and the length of a period with
financial frictions.22 I also report two variables that capture the severity of
the financial frictions, which are represented by the mean value of the multi-
plier in those periods when the multiplier is positive and the maximum value
reached during the simulation. In Table 3.5 all these variables are reported
along with their percentage deviation from the baseline.
Table 3.5: Counterfactuals
Feature Baseline CCyB Dev. % Fiscal Dev. % Monetary Dev. %
Policy Policy
(A) (B) (B)-(A) (C) (C)-(A) (D) (D)-(A)
V (y) 1.62 1.55 -4.1% 1.45 -10.5% 1.51 -7.0%
V (c) 2.82 2.72 -3.3% 2.09 -25.9% 2.32 -17.7%
V (i) 39.94 34.88 -12.7% 22.80 -42.9% 31.26 -21.7%
Crisis times (%) 24.60 24.00 -2.4% 24.90 1.2% 24.20 -1.6%
Length crisis 7.03 6.15 -12.4% 5.08 -27.7% 5.63 -19.9%
Mean severity 0.94 0.90 -4.5% 0.90 -5.0% 0.89 -5.5%
Max severity 11.52 11.03 -4.2% 11.11 -3.5% 11.40 -1.0%
Note: This table reports various features of the model under various macroprudential mea-
sures. The features have been computed from a simulation of the model for 1000 periods under
the same shocks. Variances are multiplied by 100. The length of a crisis period is in quarters.
The severity of the crisis is measured as the value of the multiplier (multiplied by 100). The
columns Dev. % represent the percentage deviation of the outcome under each policy with
respect to the outcome in the baseline (ie. without macroprudential policies) scenario.
In the table it can be seen that output volatility is reduced by all three
policies. Fiscal policy however seems the most effective policy in reduc-
ing volatility of real variables, whereas the least effective policy in reducing
volatility appears to be the CCyB.
The economy has financial frictions in place for about 25 per cent of the
time and no macroprudential policy seems able to significantly reduce such
number. However, the average length of the crisis (which in the baseline is
about 7 quarters) is shortened up to 5 quarters with a fiscal policy actively
fighting excessive credit. Lastly, the severity of the frictions - measured in
terms of the average and the maximum values of the multiplier - is also re-
22Here I define a period in which financial frictions are binding as a period of financial
stress. For brevity, in Table 3.5 I will label such episodes as ”crisis” episodes.
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duced under active macroprudential policies, but only modestly.23
In Appendix 3.10, some sensitivity analysis is performed with respect to
different values of the policy parameters λα, λd and λi. The exercise shows
that a significant increase of the policy parameters most of the time leads to a
reduction in volatility and in the severity of the crisis, although the gains are
relatively modest. Interestingly, raising the coefficient of the CCyB implies
that the economy stays in a financial crisis more frequently, due to the fact
that it is more likely fro the banking sector to hit the regulatory constraint.
Also, with respect to monetary policy, a stronger reaction of the interest rate
implies an increase in output volatility.
Overall, two main takeaways should be taken from the counterfactual
exercise. First, macroprudential policies seem indeed effective in smoothing
business cycle dynamics. Second, fiscal policy seems to be the most effective
policy, although there is no single dominating policy, since all of them tackle
different aspects of the dynamics induced by binding financial frictions. Fis-
cal and monetary policies display a better overall performance compared to
the countercyclical capital buffer, which may be partly attributed to the spe-
cific calibration of the Basel III buffer, but also to the mechanisms through
which the effects of this policy tool propagate through the economy.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I investigated the quantitative properties of various macro-
prudential policies and their impact on the real economy. I made use of
the method of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015b) for solving the model with
a non-linearity arising from the presence of an occasionally binding credit
constraint. I then showed how to estimate the model with likelihood-free
methods. I further showed that the non-linear model is able to generate rel-
evant asymmetries in the dynamics of output and investment that cannot be
obtained with linear models.
The results of the estimation are then used for performing counterfactual
exercises assuming that various macroprudential policies are in place. It is
shown that the activation of these policy tools can indeed reduce business
cycle fluctuations and that the most effective tool implies altering the cost of
23It has to be noted that the analysis carried so far is exclusively focussed on the trans-
mission on the real economy of macroprudential policy stimulus. However, since no bank
default will ever occur in equilibrium, the model is agnostic on whether the CCyB increases
the resilience of the banking sector. For a model of macroprudential policies in which default
in the banking sector is explicitely modelled, see Clerc et al. (2015).
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leverage for the banking sector, making leverage more costly in boom periods
and subsidizing it in times of crisis.
Further research could be in the future devoted to the study of interac-
tions and complementarities of various macroprudential policies in a non-
linear environment, and to performing welfare analyses aimed at identifying
the optimal instruments among the many available and their optimal param-
eterization.
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3.7 Appendix: Rest of the model
Households
There is a continuum of measure one of identical households. In each house-
hold there is a fraction of bankers f , while the other members of the house-
hold are workers. There is perfect consumption insurance between workers















where ct is private consumption. The flow of consumption services is subject
to habit formation, with degree η ∈ [0, 1), ht(i) is the supply of labor of each
worker in the household, χ > 0 is a scale parameter, and ζ ≥ 0 governs the
elasticity of labor supply. Finally, ϕc,t is a preference shock that follows a
zero-mean AR(1) process of the form
ϕc,t+1 = ρcϕc,t + σcǫc,t+1, ǫc,t ∼ N(0, 1).
The household maximizes (3.10) subject to the sequence of real budget con-
straints
(1 + τc)ct + dt = (1 + rd,t−1)dt−1 + (1− τw)wtht +Divt + Tt (3.11)
where wt is the real wage rate paid to worker i and dt denotes deposits pay-
ing the real interest rate rd,t. Taxes are levied on the household in the form
of a lump sum tax Tt and of taxes on consumption (τc) and on labor (τw).
Finally Divt denotes net aggregate profits redistributed by retailers, interme-
diate good firms, capital producers, and bankers to the households. Let λt
denote the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (3.11).
Intermediate Good Production
At the end of period t−1, a unit-mass continuum of intermediate good firms
finances capital purchases to be used in the next period by issuing kt−1 which
are bought by bankers at price pk,t−1. At the beginning of period t the quality
of capital is revealed to the firms through the realization of an AR(1) shock
ϕk,t, so that efficient capital is k̄t =e
ϕk,tkt−1. In period t, these CRS firms have





where A is a scale factor, ht is the input of aggregate labor, k̄t is the input
of efficient capital (i.e. capital after the capital quality has been revealed),
and υt is the capital utilization rate, entailing a cost a(υt)k̄t (measured in final
good units). The utilization cost is such that in the deterministic steady state
a(υ) = 0. We therefore assume that
a(νt) = a0(νt − 1) +
a1
2
(νt − 1)2 , (3.12)
Finally, zt is a permanent productivity shock. Technical progress is assumed
to evolve according to the process
zt = zt−1 + ϕz,t,
ϕz,t+1 = ρzϕz,t + σzǫz,t+1, ǫz,t ∼ N(0, 1).
Let Pm,t be the price of the intermediate goods. Hence, profits obey
Pm,tA(υtk̄t)
θ(eztht)
1−θ −Wtht − a(υt)Ptk̄t
The FOC wrt ht and υt are



















In equilibrium, the return on capital obeys
1 + rk,t =
zk,t + (1− δ) pk,t
pk,t−1
eϕk,t .
This return is entirely rebated to banks to pay for the date t− 1 loan.
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Capital Producers
Capital producers buy back k̃t units old efficient capital units, add to these
new capital units using the input of final output (subject to adjustment costs)
and sell the new capital to firms at the relative price pk,t. Given that house-
holds own capital producers, the objective of a capital producer is to choose



















− it+s − pk,t+sk̃t+s
}
,
where S (·) is an adjustment cost function such that S(1) = S′(1) = 0. In the
actual implementation of the model I will assume the following functional







































Notice that the FOC on k̃t implies that any value of k̃t is consistent with profit
maximization. It follows that k̃t is pinned down by the equilibrium on the
market for used capital, yielding k̃t = (1− δ)eϕk,tkt−1, so that









Retailers simply repackage intermediate goods and sell it to the households.









Retailers face nominal rigidities à la Calvo, thus assuming that only a frac-
tion 1 − ξp of them is allowed to adjust its resale price. If retailers cannot
reoptimize, they update their prices according to the rule
Pt+1(i) = (1 + π)
1−ιp(1 + πt)
ιpPt(i)
Each retailer who is allowed to reoptimize chooses the price that the max-
imises the discounted value of profits until the price will remain fixed, subject
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Resource Constraint and Equilibrium
The aggregate resource constraint is
ct + gt + it + a(υt)e
ϕk,tkt−1 = yt.
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3.8 Appendix: Estimation Strategy
The estimation implies performing an MCMC sampler where the acceptance/rejection
criterion is given by a distance function of simulated moments from the em-
pirical ones. As for priors I make use of the output of a Bayesian estimation
from 500,000 draws of a first order approximation of the model where it is
assumed that the constraint is always binding. In this way, I can make use of
standard linear ML estimation techniques. Starting from these priors, I run
the likelihood-free algorithm as described in the following subsection.
Some ingredients of the algorithms need a further clarification. First, the
proposal distribution q(·, θt) is a standard random walk proposal: q(·, θt) ∼
N(θt, c), where the variance-covariance matrix c is obtained as the inverse of
the hessian of log-likelihood of linear model. Secondly, as for the weighting
function πε (y|x′, θ′) I make use of a Gaussian kernel density:







where T (x) and T (y) are respectively simulated and empirical moments.
The function ρ (T (x), T (y)) is instead the Mahalanobis distance between em-
pirical and simulated moments:
ρ (T (x), T (y)) =
{
[T (x)− T (y)]⊤W−1 [T (x)− T (y)]
} 1
2
where the weighting matrix W is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal el-
ements are given by the absolute deviation (in percent) between the empir-
ical moments and the moments generated by a 1,000 periods simulation of
the linear model. In this way, the algorithm is automatically assigning less
weight to the moments that the linear model is not able to accurately match.
Making use of the Gaussian kernel density has a practical advantage com-
pared to other kernel density functions in that it does not require a bound for
the maximum distance acceptable between T (x) and T (y) (see Sisson and
Fan 2011).
As a last step, the vector of moments to be targeted is also extracted from
a comparison between the data and the linear model. More precisely, the
vector T (.) is made of those moments whose sign is properly identified in a
long simulation (1,000 times) of the linear model.
Estimation algorithm
The estimation algorithm is the following:
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1. Initialize θ1, x1(θ1)
2. For steps t = 1, ..., T
a) Generate θ′ from the proposal distribution q(·, θt)
b) compute x′ ∼ π (x|θ′)






d) Draw u ∼ U [0, 1]
i. if u ≤ r then (xt+1, θt+1) = (x′, θ′)
ii. else (xt+1, θt+1) = (xt, θt)
e) Go back to step (a).
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3.9 Appendix: Data Sources
• real per capita gdp, y: Source: Istat, quarterly national accounts.
• real per capita consumption, c: final consumption expenditure of house-
holds and non-profit institutions serving households. Source: Istat,
quarterly national accounts.
• real per capita investment, i: gross fixed capital formation. Source: Is-
tat, quarterly national accounts.
• rate on deposits, Rd: Banks: average yield on bonds - outstanding
amounts. Source: Bank of Italy, Money and banking.
• rate on loans to firms, Rk: Bank interest rates on euro loans to non-
financial corporations: new business. Interest rate - loans other than
bank overdrafts to non-financial corporations - new business. Source:
Bank of Italy, Money and banking.
• rate on government debt, Rb: Average gross yield-to-maturity on bonds
in the sample of pubblic-sector securities, subject to withholding tax
listed on the Stock Exchange (Rendistato). Source: Bank of Italy, The
financial market.
• inflation rate, π: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices. Source: ECB.
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3.10 Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3.6: Sensitivity of CCyB policy
λα 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
V (y) 1.57 1.55 1.53 1.52 1.50
V (c) 2.75 2.72 2.70 2.67 2.65
V (i) 36.46 34.88 33.40 32.01 30.72
Times in a crisis (%) 24.50 24.00 23.70 24.00 24.20
Length of a crisis (quarters) 6.28 6.15 5.78 5.71 5.76
Mean severity 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.87
max severity 11.06 11.03 10.99 10.95 10.90
Max ϕ 18.94 19.75 20.54 21.32 22.07
Median ϕ 14.48 14.63 14.73 14.79 14.88
Note: This table reports various features of the model under different values of λα. The fea-
tures have been computed from a simulation of the model for 1000 periods under the same
shocks. Variances are multiplied by 100. The length of a crisis period is in quarters. The sever-
ity of the crisis is measured as the value of the multiplier (multiplied by 100).
Table 3.7: Sensitivity of fiscal policy
λd 0.75 0.9 1.2 1.5 2
V (y) 1.47 1.45 1.43 1.41 1.40
V (c) 2.16 2.09 1.96 1.87 1.75
V (i) 23.96 22.80 21.45 21.02 21.57
Times in a crisis (%) 24.50 24.90 25.00 24.70 24.20
Length of a crisis (quarters) 5.10 5.08 4.55 4.26 4.25
Mean severity 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.88
Max severity 11.08 11.11 11.18 11.28 11.48
Max tax rate 9.30 10.87 13.83 16.62 21.00
Note: This table reports various features of the model under different values of λd. The features
have been computed from a simulation of the model for 1000 periods under the same shocks.
Variances are multiplied by 100. The length of a crisis period is in quarters. The severity of the
crisis is measured as the value of the multiplier (multiplied by 100).
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Table 3.8: Sensitivity of Monetary policy
λi 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.125
V (y) 1.50 1.51 1.63 1.85 2.18
V (c) 2.55 2.32 2.12 1.96 1.82
V (i) 35.19 31.26 28.12 25.79 24.24
Times in a crisis (%) 24.30 24.20 24.30 24.40 24.60
Length of a crisis (quarters) 5.93 5.63 5.06 4.98 4.64
Mean severity 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.82
Max severity 11.27 11.40 11.51 11.60 11.66
Note: This table reports various features of the model under different values of λi. The features
have been computed from a simulation of the model for 1000 periods under the same shocks.
Variances are multiplied by 100. The length of a crisis period is in quarters. The severity of the
crisis is measured as the value of the multiplier (multiplied by 100).
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CÚRDIA, V. AND M. WOODFORD (2015): “Credit frictions and optimal mon-
etary policy,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
EUROSTAT (2014): “Taxation trends in the European Union: 2014 edition,”
Tech. rep.
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The recent financial crisis has served as a reminder of the potential danger
of ignoring the role of financial markets and of financial intermediaries and
the relevance of informational frictions in shaping the decisions of economic
agents. In this thesis we explored the above issues on several dimensions.
First, we highlighted the danger caused by undisciplined collateralized
debt markets. In Chapter 1, we used home equity extraction as a case study
to explore the distortions arising from natural expectations about future val-
ues of collateral. We showed that natural expectations arose during the period
of the recent housing price boom because of the failure of households and fi-
nancial experts to take into account the complex structure of house prices. We
showed that agents may end up overestimating long-run prices if they make
use of models that fail to capture the rich autocorrelation structure of housing
prices and its mean-reverting component. While the notion that households
are likely to misestimate house prices has been documented in the literature,
in Chapter 1 we provided evidence that financial experts also were too opti-
mistic about long-run prices before and during the recent house price boom.
We showed the quantitative implications of natural expectations in a model
where households and banks interact through a collateralized financial in-
strument. The model has then been fed with a set of expectations that differ
in their ability to capture hump-shaped housing price dynamics. We docu-
mented that after a positive shock on housing prices, less natural agents ex-
pect a lower persistence of the shock. In contrast, natural agents overestimate
the persistence of the process, thus leading to overly optimistic long-run fore-
casts. We then simulated the model by considering housing price dynamics
as observed during the 2000s. Our models predict a positive relationship
between the amount of home equity extracted in a boom phase and the de-
133
gree of naturalness of the agents in the credit market, while at the same time
stressing the prominence of banks’ expectations in the equilibrium outcome.
A version of the model in which agents hold natural expectations seems to
capture the dynamics of U.S. home equity extraction during the recent boom
and bust relatively well. Finally, we highlighted that financial experts natu-
ralness is a crucial component for observing a large accumulation of debt at
low interest rates.
Further, in Chapter 2 we highlighted the relationship between imperfect
or “noisy” information and the conduct of fiscal policy. The role of imper-
fect information in business cycles is indeed one of the most promising re-
search paths recently explored in macroeconomics. Using official forecasts of
government spending as reported in the annual budgets of Canada, the UK
and the US, we demonstrated the implementation of a limited information
approach (a simple method of moments) to identify news and noise. The
amount of noise observed for these three countries is significant: on aver-
age, the percentage of noise in official government spending forecasts ranges
from 28% to 84%. Using these values in a richer DSGE setting, we highlighted
the detrimental effects on fiscal multipliers, particularly on investment mul-
tipliers. Our approach can be fruitfully extended to other policy settings in
which announcements play crucial roles, such as monetary policy (forward
guidance) or banking regulations and structural reforms implemented with
lags.
In Chapter 3 we investigated the quantitative properties of various macro-
prudential policies and their impact on the real economy. We made use of a
new solution method for solving the model with a non-linearity arising from
the presence of an occasionally binding credit constraint. We then showed
how to estimate the model with likelihood-free methods. We further showed
that the non-linear model is able to generate relevant asymmetries in the dy-
namics of output and investment that cannot be obtained with linear mod-
els. The results of the estimation are then used for performing counterfactual
exercises assuming that various macroprudential policies are in place. It is
shown that the activation of these policy tools can indeed reduce business
cycle fluctuations and that the most effective tool implies altering the cost
of leverage for the banking sector, making leverage more costly in boom pe-
riods and subsidizing it in times of crisis. Further research could be in the
future devoted to the study of interactions and complementarities of vari-
ous macroprudential policies in a non-linear environment, and to perform-
ing welfare analyses aimed at identifying the optimal instruments among the
many available and their optimal parameterization.
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